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ABSTRACT OF "ON INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND 
BIOLOGY" 
The thesis is that contrary to the received ' popular wisdom, the combination of David 
Hume's sceptical enquiry and Charles Darwin's provision of an alternative theoretical 
framework to the then current paradigm of natural theology did not succeed in defeating 
tl\e design argument. I argue that William Paley's work best represented the status quo in 
the philosophy of biology circa 1800 and that with the logical mechanisms provided us 
by William Dembski in his seminal work on probability, there is a strong argument for 
thr work of-Michael Behe to stand in a similar position today to that of Paley two 
centuries ago. The argument runs as follows: 
In Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter I I introduce the issues. In Section 3 I argue that William 
Paley's exposition of the design argument was archetypical of the natural theology school 
and that given Hume's already published criticism of the argument, Paley for one did not 
feel the design argument to be done for. I further argue in Section 4 that Hume in fact did 
no such thing and that neither did he see himself as having done so, but that the design 
argument was weak rather than fallacious. In Section 5 I outline the demise of natural 
theology as the dominant school of thought in the philosophy of biology, ascribing this to 
the rise of Darwinism and subsequently neo-Darwinism. I argue that design arguments 
were again not defeated but went into abeyance with the rise of a new paradigm 
associated with Darwinism, namely methodological naturalism. 
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In Chapter 2 I advance the project by a discussion of William Dembski's formulation of 
design inferences, demonstrating their value in both everyday and technical usage. This is 
stated in Section I. In Sections 2 and 3 I discuss Dembski's treatment of probability, 
whilst in Section 4 I examine Dembski's tying of different levels of probability to 
different mechanisms of explanation used in explicating the world. Section 5 is my 
analysis of the logic of the formal statement of the design argument according to 
Dembski. In Section 6 I encapsulate objections to Dembski. I conclude the chapter (with 
S~ction 7) by claiming that Dembski forwards a coherent model of design inferences that 
can be used in demonstrating that there is little difference between the way that Paley 
came to his conclusions two centuries ago and how modem philosophers of biology (such 
as \r take Mi~hael Behe to be, albeit that by profession he is a scientist) come to theirs 
when offering design explanations. Inference to the best explanation is demonstrated as 
lying at the crux of design arguments. 
In Chapter 3 I draw together the work of Michael Behe and Paley, showing through the 
mechanism of Dembski's work that they are closely related in many respects and that 
neither position is to be lightly dismissed. Section 1 introduces this. In Section 2 I 
introduce Behe's concept of irreducible complexity in the light of (functional) 
explanation. Section 3 is a detailed analysis of irreducible complexity. Section 4 raises 
and covers objections to Behe with the general theme being that (neo-) Darwinians beg 
the question against him. In Section 4 I apply the Dembskian mechanic directly to Behe's 
work. I argue that Behe does not quite meet the Dembskian criteria he needs to in order 
for his argument to stand as anything other than defeasible. However, in Section 5 I 
IV 
conclude by arguing that this is exactly what we are to expect from Behe's and similar 
theories, even within competing paradigms, in the philosophy of biology, given that 
inference to the best explanation is the logical lever therein at work. 
v 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last ten years a resurgence of interest in teleological explanations for the existence 
of God has occurred, both from the point of view of modem cosmology and biology. The 
fundamental notion is that both the intricate sub-systems of the physical cosmos and 
those of living organisms display a remarkable adaptiveness to function such that it 
appears that they are designed to be that way. The physical constants of the universe 
display apparent fine-tuning; that is to say that if their values were only slightly different, 
there would be no recognisable universe. Since the probability of this universe being so 
is incredibly small, it is difficult to accept mere chance as an adequate explanation. That 
i 
the~e constants were fme-tuned, that is designed to be just so, is an explanation which 
merits serious consideration. Developments in biology over the last two decades reveal a 
similar phenomenon: the complexity and detail required at the cellular and biochemical 
levels in order for such systems to function at all seems to lie beyond the realm of chance 
and selection effects. The Darwinian mechanisms simply fail to adequately account for 
this adaptiveness to function. Intelligent design theory has in the last ten years made 
significant ground in covering this explanatory gap. 
That this should be the case is surprising, given that the contemporary philosophical and 
scientific orthodox belief is that design arguments were summarily dealt with by Hume 
and Darwin. Hume famously showed that the design argument drew a ridiculously weak 
analogy between human artefacts and biological systems, which could not lead logically 
to positing any properties to a designer that would be needed for the argument to count as 
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proof of the existence of the theistic God. Darwin provided us with a mechanism to 
understand how the appearance of design can come about through the blind process of 
chance combined with natural selection. If the new evidence in cosmology and 
especially in biology is susceptible to the traditional Humean and Darwinian criticisms, 
then the revitalised design argument has little chance of success. If the new argument is 
significantly different to the old biological design argument, or if the criticisms are 
levelled at straw men, then the new design argument provides us with compelling 
eyidence from the lowest levels of organisation for the existence of intelligent agency at 
work at the highest levels. 
vie are in a position today to bring a far more powerful and sophisticated explanatory 
apparatus to bear on data that is suggestive of design. William Dembski has in a number 
of very recent books I provided an account of how to make an accurate inference to 
design. He makes recourse to both traditional probability theory and modem infonnation 
theory, giving the most comprehensive account of design inferences yet. By analysing 
the probability of an event's occurring, we can assign regularity or chance explanations to 
it. Where neither will do, specifically in the realm of very small probability, then we are 
licensed to infer design if and only if the event has a certain degree of patterned 
complexity, which refers to information content and which Dembski terms specification. 
This explanatory filter will prove useful in an analysis of whether the new evidence from 
biology really does invoke design. 
I Dembski, W. A.; Eliminating Chance Through Small Probabilities; Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge (1998) . 
Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science and Theology; InterVarsity Press, 
Downer's Grove (1999). 
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Among the prominent exponents of the new biological argument for design is Michael 
Behe. Irreducible complexity, argues Behe, is present at the sub-cellular level and is 
simply a level of complexity that admits of no further mechanistic explanatory reduction 
while retaining function. Behe's theory is not popular with the scientific orthodoxy, but 
his theory must be examined on its own merits. If he is correct that Darwinian and neo-
Darwinian natural selection cannot account for the existence of certain irreducibly 
c?mplex systems, then we are faced withprimafacie evidence of design. Ifwarrant to a 
design inference is provided on Dembski's grounds, then we have de facto evidence of 
design in biology. 
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1) THE DESIGN ARGUMENT: PAST INCARNATIONS AND 
APPARENT REFUTATIONS 
1.1) Prologue to the Chapter 
Every day in some part of the world police detectives look for and find evidence of a 
·crime, which evidence they then use to form an inference as to what occurred and as to 
who perpetrated the act. Every day in some part of the world doctors examine their 
, 
. 
patients for symptoms and on the basis of these infer the illness that the patient is 
suffering from and prescribe the relevant cure. Every day in some part of the world, 
scientists are. observing phenomena and postulating theories to account for and predict 
\ 
further such observations. In all of these instances, an inference is made from the 
presence of certain features of the world to the existence of some causal factor. In the 
first case, that of the detectives, the inference is to the existence of an intelligent agent. 
This method of establishing the existence of certain causal forces and or agents is in 
common and successful usage not only in everyday life, but also in science; it is by its 
success a legitimate method of practical reasoning. It is precisely this sort of inference 
that the design argument constitutes and that I will be treating. 
1.2) Introduction to the Chapter 
The design argument is an argument in favour of the existence of God. It has in the past 
been particularly concerned with attempting to prove the existence of the monotheistic 
2 I shall refrain from calling this or any other theistic argument a 'proof. as is often done. Tenning it a 
'proof indicates that there can be no doubt that the conclusion reached is both valid and truc. Quite clearly, 
since the sceptic is calling exactly this into question, we cannot call any such argument a 'proof. 
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God specifically of the Judaeo-Christian religion'. The design argument is most often 
named the argument from design. That is to say that design is usually taken as an initial 
premise, from which it is reasoned that a designer must exist. So, someone points out 
certain features of the world and says that these features are obviously marks of design; a 
design requires a designer; and so there must of necessity be one. The obvious reply to 
this argument is to take issue with the initial assumption, that there is indeed any design 
(or marks thereof) to be pointed to. If there are not, then the inference to a designer is 
o~viously not justified. Of course, the conclusion could remain true, but it will not be 
valid. The argument is then easily demonstrated as being unconvincing. 
I 6elieve that it is first necessary that the existence of marks of design be verified, before 
arguing to the existence of a potential designer. This requires more than an appeal to 
brute fact, for to some it may not be as obvious as to others that this, say, is a mark of 
design. In other words, to refute an argument from design, it is simply necessary to 
disagree with its proponent that what said proponent points to indeed is a mark of design. 
I believe that in most cases this is the route that the sceptic (or the atheist, agnostic or 
devil's advocate) follows. From this simple analysis of what goes on in a typical design 
argument, we can begin to see the issues that really require treatment with regard to this 
particular argument for God's existence. The first issue (although this does not follow 
from the example given above) is that we have to address the possibility of there being a 
design argument at all. That is to say that we have to ask if it can ever be valid to make 
an inference to design. The second question that needs to be addressed is that of the 
3 References to God are throughout this dissertation, unless otherwise stated, to the God of classical 
Christian theism, to wit a personal, omnipotent, omniscient. omnipresent and benevolent being responsible 
for creating but separate from, yet capable of intervening in, the natural world. 
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facts, phenomena or events that are used as evidence for there being design. It must be 
established whether or not these can legitimately be taken as marks or instances of 
design. 
Regarding the first question, Dembski's work has shown that the inference to design 
takes the form of a valid deductive argument. Immediately we see, however, that the 
traditional idea of an argument from design is not what has this validity. Rather, it is the 
in,ference to design. That is to say that the correct formulation of what may generically 
be called a design argument is an argument to or fur design. This is pertinent to the 
second question raised above. The argument must first take the form a priori before it 
, . 
can be successful as an argument a posteriori. I will discuss this in detail in Chapter 
Two. Once it is established that the argument to design is deductively valid, it becomes 
possible to argue from design. I will be concerned with inquiring whether the current 
biological arguments as exemplified by Behe, are deductively valid and can thus count as 
a true first premise in a successful argument from design. I will treat this in detail in 
Chapter Three. The concern of the present chapter is to layout significant parts of the 
history of the design argument, specifically the argument often characterized as being 
given from design and the supposed refutation of this argument. 
I shall in this chapter present William Paley's fonnulation of the design argument and 
specifically treat his example of the heart as an instance of intelligent design in biology. 
Although Hume wrote before Paley; and despite the common perception even among 
philosophers that Hume demolished the design argument, I shall treat Paley first. This is 
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the natural progressIOn of the argument; and I believe that Paley was the best 
representative of the natural theologians (certainly, he is taken as the representative in 
most discourse). I argue, after Richard Dawkins, Michael Behe and Elliot Sober, that 
Paley was correct, in so far as the knowledge of the day allowed; but that from our 
current perspective his argument was somewhat hasty. I then discuss the apparent 
refutation by Hume of the design argument and argue that Hume neither intended nor 
achieved such a refutation. Finally, I examine the challenge presented by evolutionary 
theory, particularly by the seminal work of Charles Darwin, to design. I argue that the 
model of evolution proposed by Darwin and refmed by the later addition of genetic 
theory - that is, the mechanism of chance variation at the genetic level plus natural 
. . 
selection - legitimately superceded the design argument for a century or so. However, I 
leave it open as to whether the (neo )-Darwinian model put paid to the design argument 
for good and whether it (that is, the neo-Darwinian mechanism) is able today to explain 
everything in biology that we might legitimately calIon it to explain. These issues will 
be revisited in Chapters Two and Three. 
1.3) The Natural Theologians, William Paley and The Design 
Argument 
Natural theology may be broadly described as the project of proving the existence of the 
God of Christianity through the scientific method4• The God of Christianity is 
traditionally a theistic God, as opposed, say, to a deistic God; HisS attributes traditionally 
4 Speake, J. (cd.); A Dictionary of Philosophy; Pan. London (1984) 
5 Throughout this dissertation I use the capitalised fonn of the male pronoun when referring specifically to 
the Christian or theistic God, as is the common English usage. 
9 
and most importantly include omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence and benevolence. 
That God possesses these attributes is taken as an analytical truth - the being possessing 
those attributes simply is God; if no being extant possesses all these attributes, then the 
hypothetical being that did would be labelled "God". Given that God possesses these 
characteristics, it is assumed that He is capable of any possible act of agency. The 
outcome of any action is known to God before the fact of its occurrence; and He is able to 
perform any action He chooses to. Perhaps He can arrange outcomes to suit His 
p~rposes. Given that God has these abilities through definition, it is possible to ascribe 
any act that cannot be ascribed to normal agency (that is, human agency) to God. 
. . 
AS regards the scientific method, there are competing accounts of what this consists in6• 
For the purposes of this discussion it can be taken in a broad sense as meaning the 
derivation of natural principles and causes and the prediction of events based on 
observation and repeatable experiments. So the aim of the project of natural theology 
was basically the valid deduction ofthe Christian God' s existence through observing the 
world. The design argument is virtually synonymous with this project, for it takes 
observations from the world around us as evidence for the existence of a supernatural 
agency. 
Natural theology was the dominant paradigm of scientific and religious thought for the 
few centuries preceding Darwin. In fact, the advent of Hume did little or nothing to 
6 Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend - all have different accounts of the scientific 
method, ranging from the orthodox and similar approaches of Popper and Kuhn to the drastically 
unconventional approach ofFeyerabend. See for instance 
10 
change this situation7• Consider that, as pointed out above, Paley actually wrote post 
Hume; natural theology did not necessarily take the impact of Hume particularly 
seriously - but more on this later in Section 1.4. Paley's most influential work on natural 
theology was, fittingly if somewhat uninspired, titled Natural Theology8; he also 
published on revealed theology, which takes into account the testimony of miracles, 
personal experience and the like and which is not directly relevant to this project. In 
Natural Theology, Paley sets out a number of examples of natural phenomena (where by 
p~enomena I mean both events and objects) that resemble in relevant aspects human 
causation or artefacts. 
Paley plunged right in; he stated his thesis in the opening paragraph of Natural Theology: 
"In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how 
the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer, that for any thing I knew to the 
contrary it had lain there for ever; nor would it, perhaps, be very easy to show the 
absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it 
should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think 
of the answer which I had before given, that for any thing I knew the watch might 
have always been there. Yet why should this answer not serve for the watch as well 
as for the stone; why is it not as admissible in the second case as in the first? For 
this reason, and for no other, namely, that when we come to inspect the watch, we 
perceive - what we could not discover in the stone - that its several parts are framed 
and put together for a purpose e.g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce 
7 Dembski, W .. A.; Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science and Theology; IntcrVarsity Press, 
Downer's Grove (1999) 
• Paley, William; Natural Theology; J. Vincent, Oxford (1828) 
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motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out tile hour of the day; that if the 
different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, or placed after any 
other manner or in any other order than that in which they are placed, either no 
motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have 
answered the use that is now served by it...This mechanism being observed - it 
requires indeed an examination of the instrument, and perhaps some knowledge of 
the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have said, observed 
and understood, the inference we think is inevitable, that the watch must have had a 
maker - that there must have existed, at some time and at some place or other, an 
artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to 
answer to, who comprehended its construction and designed its use.'" 
The example of the watch is Paley's most famous, if only because he uses it to state his 
thesis. This example may be standardized much as Hume's formulation of the design 
argument can (see Section 1.4): 
(1) P has A 
(2) P has B 
(3) Q has A 
(4)QhasB 
(5) P has C 
(6) Therefore Q has C 
, Paley; Natural Theology; as quoted in Dawkins, R.; The Blind Watchmaker; Longmans, Harlow (1986); 
pg.4. 
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Legend 
P = human artefact (in this case a watch) 
Q = a natural phenomenon (not stated explicitly at this point in the argument) 
A = means to ends relations 
B = coherence of parts 
C = mind or intelligence as cause of design 
The argument appears to be sound. Given that P has A, Band C, it would seem at least 
more probable that Q, having A and B, would have C than ifQ did not have A and B. At 
least some arguments from analogy, then, are based to some degree on epistemic 
probabilities. Given that it becomes more probable that Q has C if it has A and B (given 
the properties ofP) than ifit did not, it does seem more probable that Q has C than not-C. 
However, what this quick analysis misses is that there may well be other properties of Q 
that counteract the relevance of the analogy with P. If these other properties cause our 
estimation of the (epistemic) probabilities ofQ having C to fall, then the analogy will not 
work. So the validity ofthe argument is dependent on the list of properties relevant to the 
analogy being complete; any element of doubt may lead to a diminishing of the epistemic 
probabilities to the point where we do not accept the conclusion of the analogy. An 
example is useful at this point. 
Say that the world is more like a vegetable than like a machine - as per Hume's example. 
Given the background knowledge that vegetables do not spring into place fully-grown, 
13 
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we might then think that the world too cannot have sprung into existence fully-grown -
that is, as it now is. However, after ascertaining that the Earth's circumference has never 
expanded, we would change our view that the world is like a vegetable. The probability 
of our believing the world is like a vegetable goes down with the belief that the world has 
never grown. 
A further general example demonstrates that the reasoning holds for more than just 
arialogy but also for any use of epistemic probability, even in deductive arguments. 
Say Robinson Crusoe discovers a footprint in the sand of human shape and size. Given 
his background knowledge that only humans make such indentations in the sand when 
walking barefoot, we may well believe that Crusoe will think there is a human on the 
island. After ascertaining that it is not his own footprint, his assumption, we think, will 
no doubt be that there is another human on the island. If, however, Crusoe also believed 
that demons were in the habit of forging human footprints so as to torture lonely 
castaways, then we may well change our view of what Crusoe might think of the 
footprint's origin and implications. The probability of his believing that a human caused 
the footprint to be there goes down with this belief; the probability of our thinking that he 
will believe the footprint to be human-caused will go down on receipt of this information 
too. 
In other words, epistemic probabilities can change (they may go up or down; or in other 
words the event they refer to may become more or less likely) with the receipt of further 
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background intonnation regarding a situation. The fonn of argument used by Paley 
depends on there being relevant background knowledge of both sides to the analogy and 
that such infonnation increases the probability of further infonnation known of one side 
to apply to the other. Such an argument is always in danger of being shown to be invalid 
(that is, by being shown to be disanalogous) and so the conclusion is defeasible. Given 
that it is defeasible, it cannot be called a proof, since a proof is demonstrably and 
necessarily true. It may be the case that the conclusion of the analogy is true; but that 
cejtainty eludes us until all the relevant infonnation is available. 
So assuming the validity of the fonn of argument used by Paley; and assuming that the 
: 
fonn is argument from analogy; and granting the truth of the premises; the conclusion 
certainly seems to follow, viz. that certain natural phenomena have as their cause the 
action of intelligent agents. The conclusion fails to follow if the background infonnation 
pertaining to those natural phenomena changes - that is, the premises are altered such that 
the weight of probability lies against there being an intelligent cause for the natural 
phenomenon in question. Paley in his initial statement of the thesis, as quoted above, 
does not flesh out the argument by providing us with all the premises and relevant 
analogous properties between artefacts and natural phenomena, since he wishes to present 
a general fonnulation that might apply to various different natural phenomena. In order 
to see the value in setting out the argument in standardized fonn and examining the 
impact on epistemic probability of the various premises, I will proceed to examine 
specifically the examples of the heart and the eye as evidence for intelligent design in 
nature. As regards the heart, Paley writes: 
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"It is evident that it must require the interposition of valves - that the success indeed 
of its action must depend upon these; for when anyone of its cavities contracts, the 
necessary tendency of the force will be to drive the enclosed blood not only into the 
mouth of the artery where it ought to go, but also back again into the mouth of the 
vein from which it flowed .. .The heart, constituted as it is, can no more work without 
valves than a pump can."'· 
The heart is a biomechanical system. That is to say that it is biological in nature but 
mechanical in its character and operation. It may suitably be described as a pump, much 
as. a water pu.mp is; for the purpose of the heart - that is, it's function within the body as a 
\ 
whole - is to pump blood so that it may circulate and oxygenate the brain, muscles and so 
on. The analogy with a watch is therefore quite suitable, since in character a watch is 
also mechanical (this is trivially obvious). Standardizing the argument then gives us (let 
us call this formulation A): 
(I) A watch exhibits means to end relations 
(2) A watch exhibits coherence of parts 
(3) The heart exhibits means to end relations 
(4) The healt exhibits coherence of parts 
(5) A watch has mind or intelligence as the cause of its design 
(6) Therefore the heart has mind or intelligence as the cause of its design 
,. Paley; Natural Theology 
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Let us arbitrarily assign an epistemic probability to the heart's having a similar cause as a 
watch, based on their sharing the properties listed in (I) through (4). Clearly, if we 
introduce another shared property and hence two new premises, the epistemic probability 
would go up (let us call this formulation B): 
(I) A watch exhibits means to end relations 
(2) A watch exhibits coherence of parts 
(3) A watch's parts move in unison once per second 
(4) The heart exhibits means to end relations 
(5) The heart exhibits coherence of parts 
(6) The heart's parts move in unison once per second 
(7) A watch has mind or intelligence as the cause of its design 
(8) Therefore the heart has mind or intelligence as the cause of its design 
Accepting for the sake of the argument the accuracy of the new premises, it is clear that 
we would assign a greater probability to the conclusion. The more similarity between the 
two objects under comparison, the greater our expectation of other relevant similar 
properties existing. If, however, we introduce properties that are not shared but which 
are relevantly comparable, the epistemic probability of the conclusion will go down (let 
us call this formulation C): 
(I) A watch exhibits means to end relations 
(2) A watch exhibits coherence of parts 
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(3) A watch is made partially of materials not found naturally occurring (glass) 
(4) The heart exhibits means to end relations 
(5) The heart exhibits coherence of parts 
(6) The heart is made entirely of materials found naturally occurring 
(7) A watch has mind or intelligence as the cause of its design 
(8) Therefore the heart has mind or intelligence as the cause of its design 
II!' this case, the disparate nature of premises (3) and (6) render the conclusion (8) less 
epistemically certain than in formulation (A) above. It ought to be abundantly clear that 
the content of the premises in an argument from analogy directly lead to the epistemic 
pr~bability o'f the conclusion's being true; that is, t1Jat the two objects or events being 
compared are similar in some unobserved (at least in t1Je one case, here the heart) feature. 
Since there is at least this one difference in fact, Paley's example will fall in the case of a 
theory appearing that fully accounts for all naturally occurring objects, or at least for all 
objects made entirely from natural materials and without the special case of human 
interference. 
Perhaps the best-known example of apparent design in biology is that of the eye. Paley 
used the eye in Natural Theology"; Darwin devoted much tinJe to it in On The Origin of 
Species '2; and Richard Dawkins has contemporarily used it in great detail in a number of 
books, perhaps most importantly in The Blind Watchmaker and Climbing Mount 
II Paley; Natural Theology: pg 
12 Darwin. C.; On the Origin of Species; 
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Improbable'3. The eye is a marvel of nature - without it, entire concepts would be non-
existent, for instance visual depth, colour, much of art and so forth. The eye allows that 
which possesses it more freedom in its world; it enhances the richness of experience; and 
is itself an object of aesthetic appeal (one need only point to the famous National 
Geographic cover picture of the Afghan girl for proof of this contention). As the saying 
goes, "the eyes have it". 
D.awkins waxes lyrical about the eye in his inimitable fashion, devoting an entire chapter 
(of ten in toto) to it in Climbing Mount Improbable. Not for nothing does he do this -
after all, as he is quick to point out, the eye gave Darwin himself inunense difficulty. 
: 
Dawkins indicates the magnitude of the problem posed by the humble eye when he 
mentions that there exist nine identified principles on which eyes operate in the animal 
kingdom and that at least forty different instantiations of eyes such that each might be 
supposed to have evolved independently. It is enough for us to consider the example 
conceded by Dawkins to be the most complex and thus the most in need of explanation, 
that of the human eye itself 
The human eye consists of iris, lens and retina in order from front to back. Light rays 
bounced off objects in our path enter the eye through the cornea and are focused through 
the lens on to the retina at the back of the eye, from whence the optic nerve transfers the 
upside down image to the brain, which processes the image into a right side up picture -
which is what you actually register as "seeing". Of course, that is the barest description of 
l3 Dawkins, R.; The Blind Watchmaker; Longman, Harlow (1986) 
Climbing Mount Improbable; Penguin, London (1996) 
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the function of the eye. It is considerably more complex than that. The process is more 
accurately (yet still in layman's terms) described as follows: light rays bounced off 
objects in our path and within our field of vision enter the eye through the transparent 
cornea. the light rays pass through the aqueous humour, a water-filled sac before entering 
the aperture formed by the pupil and passing through the lens. The lens focuses the light 
on its journey through the vitreous humour - the jelly-filled bulk of the eye - and on to the 
retina. Rods and cones, being light-sensitive receptors concentrated in the retina, then 
c,?nspire to send the upside down image of the object via the optic nerve and a tortuous 
route to the image-processing centre in the brain. All this is possible because the eye is 
held semi-rigidly together by the sclerotic layer (the white of the eye) which in turn 
su'n'ounds the choroid layer of blood vessels, which non-reflectively tint the inside of the 
eye to prevent light from bouncing around once it has passed through the lens. The shape 
of the lens itself is controlled by the ciliary muscles whilst the transparent conjunctiva 
protectively covers the white of the eye. 
Although one does not require knowing all this in order to understand that the eye 
functions - and very well at that - amateur photographers might well see (note how 
ubiquitous the use even in metaphor of this function) the very close and famed 
resemblance of the camera's means of operation to that of the eye. A camera is a rigid box 
equipped with a diaphragm to narrow and widen the aperture (on a decent camera in any 
event) so as to let in more or less light, through a transparent, focusing lens and then said 
light is cast on to a light sensitive film. This film is later transported by circuitous routes 
to a photographic developing centre (I am assuming this to be a standard rather than a 
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Polaroid camera). The analogy should by now be obvious. The interesting point to note 
however is that when Paley wrote, there was no such thing as a camera, let alone one 
with an adjustable aperture! So where then the analogy, one might ask? The analogy 
might as well be to a watch, as with the heart earlier. All that is required for the argument 
to go through is that there exists an analogy that can be made from some part of nature to 
some artefuct. The watch will suit us fine - much as it did Paley. However, since we have 
in hand the camera, so much more similar in actual operation as well as in principle of 
operation to the eye, I utilise it. I do not think that this constitutes an assumption of the 
conclusion - although the critic could point out that the camera is simply based on our 
observation of the human eye and that as a direct mechanical copy it is hardly surprising 
th~t the eye ;0 closely resembles the camera! Rather, this particular analogy brings home 
the point with some force that objects that demonstrate this relation to those artefacts bear 
the marks of design. Standardizing the argument constitutes formulation AI: 
(I) A camera exhibits means to end relations (viz. it exists to take images) 
(2) A camera exhibits coherence of parts (viz. were there no aperture, there would be no 
picture; likewise were there no lens etc) 
(3) A camera consists of at least certain parts (viz. the aperture, lens and film) 
(4) A camera specifically manipulates light rays to form images 
(5) A camera has mind or intelligence as the cause of its design 
(6) An eye exhibits means to end relations (viz. it exists to see) 
(7) An eye exhibits coherence of parts (viz. were any part missing, the eye would 
function either improperly or not at all) 
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(8) An eye consists of at least certain parts (viz. the cornea, lens and retina) 
(9) An eye specifically manipulates light rays to form images 
(l 0) Therefore the eye has the mind or intelligence as the cause of its design 
Al is deliberately formulated to be lengthy, to illustrate the high epistemic probability 
associated with the analogy. That is to say that the similarities between the camera and 
the eye are so many and so close that it is epistemically more probable that the conclusion 
goes through - that is, that the eye is, as with the camera, a product of intelligent design. 
1;4) Hume 
\ 
In this section I shall examine Hume's apparent refutation of the design argument as 
given in Parts Two through Eight and Twelve of the Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion14. It is commonly held that Hume refuted the design argument, showing that it 
relied on a ridiculously weak analogy. This was not Hume's own conclusion, although 
the reasoning is his. He found the design argument to be weak, not fallacious. This is 
brought out clearly in Part Twelve of the Dialogues. In this section, I first give the 
argument as Hume formulates it. I then discuss Hume's broader position on religion so 
as to set the stage for my argument that Hume did not refute the design argument. 
1.4.1) Cleanthes' Argument 
14 Humc, David ; "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion" in Tweyman. Stanley (cd.); Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion: In Focus; Routledge, London (1984). 
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In Part Twelve of the Dialogues l5, Cleanthes first presents the design argument. I quote: 
"Look round the world: Contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it 
to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser 
machines, which again admit of subdivisions, to a degree beyond what human senses 
and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most 
minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy, which ravishes into 
admiration all men, who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of 
means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the 
productions of human contrivance; of human design, thought, wisdom, and 
intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by 
all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature 
is somewhat similar to the mind of man; though possessed of much larger faculties, 
proportioned to the grandeur of the work, which he has executed. By this argument 
a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a 
deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence."" 
Following Tweyman, we can put the argument into standardized fonn as follows l7: 
(l) PI, P2, P3 ... Pn have A 
(2) PI, P2, P3 ... Pn have B 
(3) Q has A 
15 All reference to Hume's Dialogues is to the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. 
16 Hume; Dialogues; pg 109. 
17 Tweyman. Stanley; "Introduction" in Tweyman (ed.); Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: In Focus; 
pg 5. 
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(4)Q has B 
(5) PI, P2, P3 have C 
(6) Therefore Q has C 
Legend 
P = human artefact 
Q = the universe 
A = means to ends relations 
B = coherence of parts 
. -
C \= mind or intelligence as cause of design 
The argument as set out here certainly seems to be one from analogy. Given like effects, 
we infer like causes. However, we must ask if Hume has properly characterized either 
the design argument as advanced by natural theologians or in general form. I describe the 
form of the design inference in Chapter Three, where I shall return to the question of 
Hume's characterization of it as an argument from analogy. It suffices for now to say 
~at he has adequately characterized the argument previously formulated by the Greeks 
and natural theologians and somewhat later best formulated by Paley. We must then 
examine Hume's conclusions as set out in the Dialogues regarding this argument; but 
fIrst it will be appropriate to examine Hume's broader position on theological issues and 
the context of the Dialogues. 
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1.4.2) Hume's Position On Religion 
It is not at all obvious from his work that Hume was an atheist, as has been claimed18• 
Hume did not publically profess to be an atheist. This is no bar to the claim that he 
indeed was; advocates of this view claim that, given the times (Hume lived 1711-76), he 
was not able to profess to being an atheist as to do so would cost him academic 
appointments and popularity. As it was, the only academic position he ever applied for 
w!lS refused him, with the background charge of his being an atheist. It is certainly true 
, 
that Hume's views were sceptical and damaging to the religious orthodoxy, but neither 
makes one an atheist. At the most we might label him an agnostic (although the term had 
nqt yet been·coined). The usual evidence advanced in favour of his being an atheist is 
i 
that his anti-religious views are hidden behind the mask of irony and in the subtleties of 
the form that he adopted to write much of his work on religion, that ofthe dialogue. This 
is an ad hoc claim in my view - it is all to easy to claim that underlying an argument is a 
barbed shaft aimed at whatever, or a malicious motive. On Hume's own principle of 
ascribing only the causes strictly necessary to produce the effects, we are not justified in 
stating that Hume was an atheist whose apparently favourable (to religion) comments in 
places are only clever jibes and foils for his serious work of undermining religion. 
" Support for my independently-formulated argument can be found in Yandell, K.; "Hume on Religious 
Belief' and Nathan, G.; "The Existence and Nature of God in Hume's Theism" both in Livingston, D. & 
King, J. (eds); Hume: A Re-evaluation; Fordham University Press, New York (1976). Yandell argues that 
Hume's views cannot be put into the mouth of any one of the speakers in the Dialogues; and that in the end 
Hume is a kind of agnostic who believes the nature of God to be mysterious. In other words, Hume 
according to Yandell believes in the existence of some "God" being, but leaves it open as to exactly what 
kind of being this is. Nathan argues that Hume falls under the broad head of deism. Given that deism at the 
time incorporated a number of divergent positions, Hume's views were deistic in this broad sense. but 
sufficiently different to those of others to be considered on their own merit,>_ As Nathan, I believe correctly. 
points out, Hume considered himself a 'Igenuine theist". Further support for my thesis may be found in 
McLaughlin, P.; Philo's Embarrassment: Hume's Argument from Design; unpublished paper. 
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In his A Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh'9, Hume explicitly defends 
himself against the charge that he is an atheist, the occasion for this being the loss of that 
very chair he had applied for. Since the opportunity to gain the chair was past, it seems 
incorrect to argue that he was seeking to hide his real views so as to secure a position. 
The charge of atheism leveled against him in his own day and which has come down to 
us as common historical and philosophical wisdom was simply a dirty ploy by his 
philosophical opponents (who were mainly theologians and clerics - many if not most of 
th,e academics of the day being so). The revolution in philosophy that Hume aimed at 
inciting and which he indeed did was not to the taste of his opponents; the attack ad 
hi;Jminem seemed the only or best way to prevent this revolution. In the full course of 
ev~nts, it has been shown not to have succeeded in the primary and implicit aim of 
I 
preventing the revolution; it has unfortunately succeeded and continues to in the 
subsidiary and explicit aim of discrediting the man. 
The importance of this view ofHume the man will become clear in short order when, as I 
indicated, I will argue that Hume did not claim to have refuted the design argument. For 
now it suffices to say that the view of Hume as atheist has infonned the interpretation of 
Hume's treatment of the design argument in the Dialogues in a negative fashion. 
Working from the premise that Hume was an atheist, many commentators have claimed 
that Hume, mainly in the voice of Philo the sceptic, shows the design argument to be a 
non-starter. These commentators work in a circular fashion, their view of Hume 
justifYing reading him as atheist and this in tum justifYing their view of him as atheist. 
19 Hume. D.; An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding with a Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend 
in Edinburgh and Hume's Abstract ofa Treatise of Human Nature (2'" ed.); Hackett, Indianapolis (1993). 
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This view runs into the major problem of having to interpret the whole of the Letter from 
a Gentleman as tongue-in-cheek or sheer deception; the better reading, I submit, is that it 
is the impassioned defence of a man misunderstood by his peers. Further, the view of 
Hume as atheist requires a rather remarkable ad hoc turn around in Part Twelve of the 
Dialogues - certainly if one reads the sceptic Philo as Hume's voice - when Philo states 
plainly that he believes in a divine beingw. Apart from these major areas of concern, 
there are numerous other occasions in Hume's writings when he quite clearly states that 
h~ holds what he calls a "genuine theistic" belief' ; and not one instance where he claims 
to be an atheist. I believe that Hume was intellectually honest and courageous enough 
not to blatantly misrepresent his own position, especially on so important an issue as 
. . 
religious dogma. 
As regards the Dialogues themselves, Hume writes them, as the title aptly indicates, in 
dialogue fonn. There are particular nuances that may be observed in this style, peculiar 
to the eighteenth century when Hume wrote22• However, it is not apparent that the 
particular nuance of style justifies the thought that Hume was playing a deceptive hand. 
Bell argues23 that what is absent from the Dialogues is any real talk of natural religion 
itself; but this seems patently absurd. 
20 Hum., Dialogues; pg. 172. 
21 Yandell in Livingston & King; Hume: ARe-evaluation; pg. 113. 
22 For an interesting analysis ofHume's use of dialogical form, see Bell, M.; Writing and Philosophy: 
Hume's Dialogues Conceming Natural Religion; unpublished paper. 
2J Bell; Writing and Philosophy: pg. II 
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1.4.3) Hume's Conclusion on the Design Argument 
As I indicated in Section 1.3 .2), the sceptic Philo seems to undergo a major change in his 
position on the design argument in Part Twelve of the Dialogues. Philo states plainly that 
it is the impression on his senses of design in the world that makes him a theist: 
You in particular, CLEANTHES, with whom I live in unreserved intimacy; you are 
sensible, that, notwithstanding the freedom of my conversation, and my love of 
singular arguments, no-one has a deeper sense of religion impressed on his mind, or 
pays more profound adoration to the divine Being, as he discovers himself to reason, 
in the inexplicable contrivance and artifice of nature. A purpose, an intention, a 
design strikes every where the most careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man 
can be so hardened in absurd systems, as at all times to reject it." 
What is particularly striking is the use of the word "inexplicable". Is Hume 
suggesting that, at base, design in nature is not subject to the usual scientific 
mechanisms of explanation? If so, is Hume not saying precisely what Paley said 
some years later? Certainly, Hume does not conclude that the design argument is 
untenable. Rather, he concludes that, although not sufficient to demonstrate the 
existence of a designer through the use of formal premises and conclusion, it is 
nonetheless robust enough to survive logical attack due to its appeal to common 
sense. Even the greatest sceptic - even one so great as Philo - must admit that the 
design argument strikes him as somehow plausible, even in the face of growing 
24 Hume; Dialogues; pg. 172. 
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information. Quite clearly, then, the design argument is characterised by Hume as 
an inference to the best explanation when scientific explanations - despite their 
clevemess - have all failed. 
Bell argues that Hume's conclusion is that divine providence is not necessary to account 
for the existence of apparent design in nature. Despite his (Bell's) brave attempt to 
suggest that this means that there is no place for the Divine in such explanations at all, 
t4is is not Hurne's position. No amount of pottering about after the fuct - with 
evolutionary theory in hand - can suggest that Hume foresaw the demise of an argument 
he clearly thought universal to all rational thinkers. 
\ 
1.5) Darwin and Neo-Darwinism 
If as I have argued in Section 1.4 Hume did not in fact refute the design argument and it 
continued to have a fruitful intellectual life, it is nonetheless not the case that it enjoyed 
dominance into the twentieth century. The change in the fortunes of natural theology can 
be dated quite precisely to the reading of their joint paper by Alfred Russell Wallace and 
Darwin to the Linnean Society of London on July 1st 1858. By August 20th ofthat year, 
a joint paper was published; and in order to upstage (or prevent himself being upstaged 
by) Wallace, Darwin rushed On the Origin of Species to publication by November 24th 
1859. Wallace and Darwin, although today we recognize mainly Darwin, had presented 
what had eluded theorists for generations, namely a workable mechanism for evolution. 
Evolutionary theory was nothing new; Lamarck and Malthus had already set the stage for 
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Druwin by the turn of the 19th centwy. However, natural theology in Britain (and 
teleomechanism in Germany, although I will not discuss this) had weathered the storm 
with regard to these early evolutionary hypotheses. This was mainly because these 
evolutionary hypotheses did not present any viable explanation as to how traits spread 
within a population or speciation occurred. Darwin (henceforth I will refer only to 
Druwin and not Wallace, for reasons that I will adduce in short order) presented a 
workable evolutionary mechanism: random variation combined with natural selection. 
Although it would go beyond the scope of this thesis to fully describe, defend or attack 
Darwinism, it is important to note how and why it was that Darwinism came to dominate 
bi610gical th;ught in the latter half of the nineteenth century at the expense of natural 
theology. Dembski argues after Johnson that Darwinism as an evolutionary theory did 
not make much ground until into the Nineteen-Thirties. Dembski cites Chauncey Wright 
in this regard: "It would seem, at first sight, that Mr. Darwin has won a victory, not for 
himself but for Lamarck.',1S Instead, Dembski and Johnson claim that Darwin was 
responsible for introducing within his lifetime the framework of methodological 
naturalism within which the scientific orthodoxy has worked for the last one hundred and 
forty years. It was the idea that in principle everything in the natural and observable 
worlds (the two are not identicaf,) is explicable in purely natural, mechanistic terms that 
Darwin not only popularized but made possible - hence Richard Dawkins' (in)famous 
statement, " ... although atheism might have been logically tenable before Darwin, Druwin 
" Dembski; Intelligent Design; pg. 84. 
" Physics deals with the world at its lowest levels; yet not all of the entities postulated in physics are 
observable. Some are not even observable in principle, such as dark matter. 
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made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist.,,27 The contention then is that 
Darwin's revolution was not in evolution, but in the metaphysics lying behind science. 
Only later, with the discovery of the work of Mendel in the field of genetics, did 
Darwin's mechanism come to be fully described and accepted by the scientific 
orthodoxy. The relevance to natural theology is that on both counts Darwinism put paid 
to the school of Paley, Reid and company. With methodological naturalism came an 
obvious aversion to appeals to the strictly metaphysical; Occam's Razor effectively 
b~came the watchword of science. The irony - that a Christian scholastic should provide 
the tool most devastating to Christianity and theism in general - is evident. No more was 
itallowed to appeal to God as an explanation for the apparent complexity in life, even if 
th~re was no' suitable alternative and only purely naturalistic theory to account for these 
phenomena. Essentially, by redefining what counted as the "scientific method", the 
methodological naturalists defeated the end of the natural theologians to find proof of 
God according to the "scientific method". With the fashion to deny the explanatory 
necessity and efficacy of God also came the need to posit an alternative theory. Darwin's 
was the best of a possibly bad bunch; and since he had begun the revolution, it was only 
fitting that in him the naturalists found their man. 
In adopting Darwinism, biologists were getting a theory that could indeed explain many 
instances of apparent design. The theory of evolution posed by Darwin certainly dealt 
successfully with many of the questions posed by the fact of evolution. That evolution is 
a fact is in any analysis clear. The breeding by humans of dogs, for instance, is an 
unequivocal demonstration of the selection of traits thrown up randomly. Nature of 
27 Dawkins; The Blind Watchmaker; pg. 6. 
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course does not make a selection in the same way; but in suiting the dog for S h ' 
ay untmg 
duck, the human breeder is not doing anything that different to nature's 'favou' , 
nng dogs 
with the same applicable traits in areas populated by duck. That certain dogs are 
curiously suited to hunting duck is therefore no sUIprise - some, in tum are the d 
' pro uct of 
human inteIVention, whilst the others are the product of environmental pressur 
es, The 
apparent adaptation of means to ends in the dog as an entire organism - viz 'ts ' 
, ,1 stamina 
and speed, its sense of smell and hearing, its teeth and ability to sWim and s fi 
o orth, all 
suited to hunting duck - is perfectly explicable in purely natural terms, I ' 
t IS necessary 
that, given the environment certain dogs find themselves in, they adapt to that 
environment. In so far as they do not, they will become extinct. Since individUal dogs 
CaDnot adapt within their lifetime and then pass behavioural traits on - contr 
ary to the 
theory of Lamarck - nature selects, as it were, the physical traits that suit the d 
og to the 
conditions and ensure that those traits are reproduced through the Simple eXpedient of 
those dogs most exhibiting the trait being the most likely to breed succeSSfully, This is 
the core of the Darwinian theory; it provides, as I have argued above a purely , , 
, naturalIstIc 
account of how differences arise within species; and taking sllch development to its 
logical conclusion would appear to account for speciation, 
The reason that this apparently aesthetically pleasing, rounded theory dOd 
1 not have 
immediate popularity was that the mechanism by which physical traits we 
re passed on 
was unknown to the science of the day, Only with the discovery of Mendel's work did 
such a mechanism - genetic theory - become available, Given that, m' th N' 
e rneteen 
Thirties, Darwinism's successful overturning of natural theology as the ' prenuer theory 
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accounting for apparent design in nature was assured. That Darwinism did supplant 
natural theology need hardly be argued for; the alternative advanced against Darwinism 
in the last (twentieth) and into the present century has tended to be not natural theology 
(or its hallmark of intelligent design) but literal creationism. In the Scopes "Monkey 
Trial", the Arkansas and the Louisiana cases, legislation protecting or promoting literal 
creationism was struck down2s• The academically respectable theories of natural 
theology were not even at question. The victories, both legal and moral, that 
eyolutionary theory obtained were not then particularly convincing, being against the 
straw man of literal creationism. That this straw man is set up by non-evolutionists 
themselves does not render the victories of the evolutionists any less hollow; but the fact 
that must be accepted is that evolutionary theory has won out as the scientifically 
accepted theory. Darwinism has also come down to us as popular folk knowledge, 
sometimes in forms as damaging as social Darwinism. All this may be adduced as 
evidence that Darwinism indeed became, over the period 1859 to 1940, the dominant 
theory of the development of all forms of life on earth. The promise of Hume, as some 
have seen it, was fulfilled in Darwin. Natural theology, or at least its central claim about 
life, namely that it is the product of intelligent design, is only now reviving. 
28 The trial of John T. Scopes, famously filmed as Inherit the Wind in 1960, occurred in 1925 when Scopes 
voluntarily faced prosecution for teaching evolution to scholars. It constituted a moral victol)' for 
proponents ofevolutional)' theol)'. The Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act 590 was struck down in 1981 as 
unconstitutional, since it effectively advances the interests of a religion, viz. Christianity. The similar 
Louisiana Creationism Act of 1981 was struck down in 1985 for the same reasons as in Arkansas. For a 
brief but informed discussion of all three, see Berra, T. M.; Evolution and the Myth of Creationism: A 
Basic Guide to the Facts in the Evolution Debate; Stanford University Press, Stanford (1990). 
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1.6) Conclusion to the Chapter 
I have argued that the design argument was forcefully put forward by the natural 
theologians as typified by William Paley and that it was the dominant thesis in biology 
for the period roughly 1660 to 1860. The contribution of Hume in the mid-1700s, 
contrary to the received wisdom, did nothing to shake the foundations of intelligent 
de~ign. Rather, Hume demonstrated that the conclusion of the design argument was not 
the God of Christianity, but simply an intelligence of the necessary degree and power to 
account for the instances of design used to infer the existence of that designer. The 
design inference as an argument continued to enjoy considerable vitality into the mid-
1800's; it was only the advent of Darwin that brought an end to this explanatory 
hegemony. With Darwin came a new kind of metaphysical framework within which 
scientists would operate, namely that of methodological naturalism. 111is ruled out a 
priori any reference to intelligence as a causal factor in nature, putting paid to natural 
theology as a properly (on the new definition) scientific theory. More to the point and 
more legitimately, however, Darwinian evolutionary theory - random variation plus 
natural selection - provided an alternative that accounted for the facts while remaining 
within the framework of methodological naturalism. It appeared as if the design 
argument had met its match and sunk along with the ship that had carried it as intellectual 
cargo - natural theology. That this - that is, the demise of the design argument - was in 
fact not the case, I shall demonstrate in the following chapters with reference to the 
revitalized theory of intelligent design. I shall argue that, since as shown Hume did not 
rule out the validity of design arguments; and since Darwinian evolution is an empirical 
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thesis that can be falsified or found wanting on empirical grounds; the design argument 
remains a robust means of explaining the appearance of design in the world. The 
metaphysical commitments of scientists are not pertinent to this project; neither was it 
valid to define design out of existence by adhering to one particular such metaphysical 
commitment. I shall therefore give intelligent design the fair hearing it deserves and 
examine it on logical and empirical grounds rather than simply on the basis of my 
metaphysic. 
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2) DEMBSKI AND THE FORMULATION OF THE DESIGN 
INFERENCE 
2.1) Introduction to the Chapter 
In this chapter, I explain William Dembski's formulation of the design inference. 
Dembski puts it to us that there are only three explanatory apparatuses available in the 
, 
attempt to explain the occurrence of any phenomenon. These three are regularity, chance 
and design. This he believes is an exhaustive and exclusive list. The order as given is a 
tl1Jmping ord.er; that is to say that, given a regularity explanation, chance and design are 
\ 
i 
excluded; and that we look first for a regularity explanation. There are some problems 
regarding Dembski's use of certain terms, especially his use of the term 'regularity'. I 
shall explain his peculiar use of these terms in their relevant sections. Furthermore, it is 
not self-evident that Dembski 's list is exhaustive, although it seems the explanations are 
clearly mutually exclusive. I shall examine whether Dembski's categories are constituted 
broadly enough to incorporate other possible explanatory apparatuses and if so, whether 
they are then too broad. It is first necessary however to understand the notion of 
probability that Dembski bases his discussion of explanations on. 
2.2) Probability 
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Dembski distinguishes between three levels of probability, namely high, intermediate and 
small probabilities (HP, 1P, & SP). He maps each of these levels on to an appropriate 
explanatory mechanism. Dembski believes - and I agree - that by identifYing the 
probability of X occurring, we can move towards identifYing the correct mode of 
explanation for X occurring. It is necessary to explain the distinction between these 
different levels of probability before addressing the various modes of explanation. It 
seems at first that any distinction of high from intermediate from low probabilities is 
g(>ing to be purely arbitrary. At what point do we say that a probability cannot count as 
high, but must rather count as intermediate? It seems that any line drawn must 
necessarily be somewhat pedantic:' if we draw this particular line at 0.75 (where this 
. . 
cOnstitutes the lowest of the high probabilities), it seems absurd that a probability of 0.74 
is intermediate. The practical difference between 0.75 and 0.74 seems negligible. On the 
other hand, even smaller differences (not necessarily between probabilities) are 
practically massive. There is less than 6% difference between the genetic code of the 
higher apes and humans29, yet at the macro-level we are sufficiently differentiated such as 
to provide simple recognition of our being human and their not being human. It appears 
necessary to make the distinction because Dembski will use the probability of an event's 
occurring to indicate the correct mode of explanation. If we are, on his account, to 
identifY that explanation, then we must first be sure of the probability of that event's 
occurring. In some cases, the assignation of a probability to a range (viz. HP, IP or SP) 
will be simple. It is the border line cases in which some analysis ofthe above-mentioned 
ranges will be useful. 
29 hllp:/1I10l1Ic.c11ri st imlilv .colillinillislrics/\,"orkplacc cu!lurc/scicllcclllinistlil.!sl43298.lllmllast accessed 15 
February 2003. 
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2.2.1) Subjective and Objective Probabilities 
Part of the difficulty in assigning probabilities to events lies in the study of probability 
not being an exact science. There is always an element of guesswork, albeit educated, 
involved in assigning a probability to an event. Probability theorists are not necessarily 
going to agree on the exact probability ranges to be assigned to events as important and 
controversial as the beginning of the universe, the origin of life or the complexity of 
certain organs. There is the added problem of competing methods within probability 
theory - classical and Bayesian - between which one must decide in assigning 
probabilities.- In the sections following, I discuss subjective and objective probabilities as 
\ 
they stand in classical statistical theory. Since I propose to use classical theory, I rely on 
Dembski's critique of Bayesianism, which holds it as being largely irrelevant to the 
design inference. 
2.2.1.1) Bayesian Probability 
As Dembski argues, Bayesianism is particularly suited to the comparative analysis of 
hypotheses. As more and more evidence comes in, the probabilities of the hypotheses 
change according to whether the evidence favours the given hypothesis or not, according 
to the formulaJo: 
30 h[lp :l/ll1cll1hcrs.lripod.com/~J>rohabi1itv/1J<lycsO I.hlm last accessed 15 February 2003. 
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According to the weight of evidence we have 'in' at any given time, we assign different 
likelihoods to the truth of a hypothesis. As mentioned above, this constitutes a useful 
method of comparing hypotheses. Probabilities assigned prior to receiving the evidence 
are altered according to that evidence. It is relatively simple to determine which 
hypothesis is the better - that which continues to account for the phenomena in the light 
of increased evidence; or that which suffers the least change in probability over an 
extended period of time. Once one hypothesis is demonstrated to be consistently better 
, 
able to predict phenomena, rival hypotheses can be relegated with a degree of certainty 
proportionate to the difference in success between the best and these lesser hypotheses. 
This procedure is exactly in accordance with Hume's injunction to apportion our belief 
proportionally to the evidence, or the cause to the effect. 
However, this process of deciding between rival hypotheses based on their proportional 
ability to describe and predict phenomena - in other words, to operate on the scientific 
method - is not relevant to the design inference. The design inference is precisely called 
on when none of the rival (scientific) hypotheses can account for the phenomena under 
investigation. The design inference is warranted when the rival methods and theories 
within the scientific orthodoxy are not able to produce a single clear explanation. TIle 
design inference then eliminates these hypotheses and turns instead to design as an 
explanation. So as Dembski puts it, the Bayesian method is mainly comparative, but the 
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design inference is eliminative. The design inference does not involve the continuous 
weighing of hypotheses, but rules hypotheses out as being explanatorily ineffective, in so 
far as no one of these hypotheses has any better claim than another to being the correct 
hypothesis. 
The Bayesian mechanism is then ruled out as being irrelevant to the work of the design 
inference and we fall back on classical probability theory. I discuss the role of subjective 
or epistemic probabilities and the role of objective or real probabilities in the following 
section. 
2;,2.1.2) Su.bjective and Objective Probabilities 
\ 
Brian Skyrrns has produced in Choice & Chance31 an excellent introduction to the field of 
probability and induction. I propose to use this as the basis for my discussion of 
subjective and objective probabilities. 
If we wish to evaluate the probability of an argument' s being true, we have at least three 
types of probability to assign the argument. These are certainty, inductive probability 
and epistemic probability. Certainty means that the probability of the arguments' being 
true is 1. It is impossible for the argument to be incorrect. This occurs when a 
deductively valid argument is based on true premises. Such an argument's conclusion 
provides no information not already contained (perhaps implicitly) in the premises; for 
the conclusion to be false would contradict the truth status of at least one of the premises. 
31 Skyrms, B.; Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic (3" cd.); Wadsworth, Belmont 
(1986). 
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Therefore, a valid deduction based on true premises must render a true conclusion. The 
probability ofthis is 1 or certainty. For example, we may consider this : 
Premise 1: Whenever it rains there are clouds in the sky 
Premise 2: It is raining 
Conclusion: Therefore there are clouds in the sky 
1pe true premises of the argument render the conclusion necessarily true. The argument 
is both formally valid (the conclusion follows directly from the premises) and true (rain 
indeed requires clouds in our world). This probability is of the objective type. It is not 
sJbject to varied information or the vagaries of the human experiment - the probability 
involved is I, only 1 and must be 1, whether or not there are any minds to concern 
themselves with that fact about the world. 
An inductive argument (or inductively probable argument) is one that is not formally 
valid but which nonetheless can produce a true conclusion. The premises, although they 
do not necessitate the conclusion, make it likely. Analytically the argument is fallacious; 
synthetically it may be true. Consider this example: 
Premise 1: It hardly ever rains in the desert 
Premise 2: This is a desert 
Conclusion: Therefore it is not now raining 
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Although in all probability it is not raining - this being a desert - it is not necessarily true 
that it is not now raining. After all, it does rain sometimes in the desert; and given the 
premises, now is as good a time as any time for it to rain. In our experience, the chance 
that it rains on any given day is the same (without knowing weather patterns, whether 
there are clouds or not etc). Any day is as good as any other day for it to rain. However, 
we also know it to be true that it seldom rains in deserts (that premise is at least 
analytically true - part of what it is to be a desert is for it not to rain often). There is little 
c~ance of our being incorrect in our then saying that it is not now raining. So the 
conclusion remains probably true, even though the argument is invalid. We would be 
justified by experience in believing that it is not now raining; and experience is virtually a 
sy'nonym for induction. Hence it is inductively probable that the conclusion is true. 
Skyrrns argues that the sort of probability that applies to an argument's being true is an 
inductive one. That is to say that the probability of the conclusion' s being true is based 
on the assumption of the truth of the premises. In other words, given the truth of the 
premises, the probability of the conclusion's being true is the inductive probability ofthe 
argument as a whole. It appears then that inductive probabilities fall between being 
objective and sUbjective. However, given the involvement of minds - necessary for the 
process of induction to occur, through experience and experiment - inductive 
probabilities must surely be classified as subjective. 
2.2.1.3) Epistemic Probability 
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Epistemic probability, as the term suggests, is concerned with the believed probability of 
an event's occurring. Although the actual probability of the event's occurring may 
hypothetically be subject to determination, it is often the case that premises necessary to 
reaching such a conclusion are not available to us. In other words, the necessary 
information required to formulate the true probability of the event's occurring is not as 
yet available to us and hence the true probability cannot as yet be determined. As the 
information comes in, we alter our belief in what the probability is that the event will 
o~cur. This is the principle on which punters place bets on horses, or bookmakers make 
the odds. When the bookmaker hears that a certain horse has won it's last two races, he 
may give it good odds on winning. If the bookmaker then hears that the horse last raced 
. -
thfee years ago, at which time it won the two races it ran in, he is liable to lower the odds. 
The true odds ofa horse's winning a given race are to us incalculable - even if the race is 
rigged, those paid to rig it may fail to do so. However, we can hold an educated opinion 
as to which horse is, in the ordinary course of events, most likely to win. This is an 
epistemic probability - it is a belief in the chances of the horse's winning, which is 
subject to change on the receipt of further information. 
The nature of epistemic probability is essentially subjective because the information 
available to me is not necessarily the same as that available to yoU.32 Epistemic 
probabilities depend on beliefS; and beliefs are usually taken to be subjective. 
2.3 Probability Ranges 
32 Skyrms; Choice & Chance; pg. 15 - 16. 
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2.3.1 High Probability 
High probabilities (HP) are probabilities that are close to I. That is, the closer a 
probability is to being 1, the more obvious it is that we are dealing with a high 
probability. When the probability of some phenomenon occurring is I - a certainty - then 
this too counts as a high probability. There is thus no problem in establishing the upper 
bound of high probability. To say that something must occur is usefully put into 
p~obabilistic language by saying that that phenomenon has a I probability of occurring. 
The difficulty lies in establishing the lower bound of high probability, which as indicated 
above is also the demarcation between high and intermediate probability. 
An: example of an event of high probability is the chance of the occurrence of 
thundershowers tomorrow being 99% (0.99). With this forecast, we are certain enough of 
the occurrence ofthe event (that it is going to rain) to layout a raincoat with tomorrow's 
clothing. Our behaviour indicates that we believe the event is more likely to occur than 
not, which must finally be the criterion for the event being one ofHP. To some extent, 
induction must playa part in the process of assigning probabilities here. If tomorrow it 
does not rain, we would not be justified in assuming that we incorrectly assigned an HP 
to the event. It is neither unbelievable nor statistically anomalous for an event of 
probability 0.99 not to occur. By assigning a probability of 0.99, we are indicating that in 
99 out of every 100 instances of these conditions pertaining, it rains. That on this 
occasion it does not rain is then catered for. In so far as 99 out of every 100 of such 
predictions in such circumstances is correct (i.e. it rains), the assigning of an HP IS 
correct. The calling of such a probability 'HP' is also then correct. 
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2.3.2) Intermediate Probability 
Intennediate probabilities (IP) fall between high and small probabilities. I would argue 
that they tend towards probability 0.533• This is not simply because IP falls between HP 
and SP. An event of 0.5 probability has, as is obvious, an equal chance of occurring or 
not occurring. Now, given that I have characterized HP as tending towards 1 and given 
. , 
tl'ial I will later characterize SP as tending towards 0, it seems natural that 0.5 be chosen 
as ' the 'aiming point' of IP. At 0.5 probability, there is a perfect balance between an 
event tending towards HP or SP. In other words, it does not tend towards either. It is in 
this'\sense th;t the event tends towards probability 0.5. 
An example of an IP event would be the chance of the OCCUlTence of thundershowers 
tomorrow being 51 %. That is to say that in 51 out of every 100 instances of these exact 
conditions pertaining, it rains. Alternatively, in 49 out of every 100 such instances, it 
does not rain. The chances of it raining or not raining are practically the same. That is to 
say that few people would actually be more sure of its raining tomorrow than not. It 
would not be a clever gambler who bet on an event of 0.51 probability simply in view of 
the probability being greater than even. 
3J The expression "tcnd(ing) towards requires some clarification. There is no built-in tendency for a 
phenomenon to gravitate towards a specific probability. The probability of X's occurring is not 
teleological at this level; it is not the purpose of X to tend towards, say, I. Neither is the expression meant 
to indicate any real movement of the probability towards one of these three points (viz. I, 0.5 & 0). It 
simply indicates the probability's lying in a range best characterised by specific reference to one of these 
three points. 
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2.3.3) Small Probability 
Events of small probability (SP) can more obviously be labelled events of low 
probability. The use of the term "small" is peculiar given Dembski's use of "high" in 
HP. If he had termed these "large", it would be proper to call SP events "small". I will 
henceforth refer to such probabilities as LP, for 'low probabilities'. We can run a 
description ofLP parallel to that ofHP. LP events are events that are almost certainly not 
gqing to occur. The closer the probability to zero of an event occurring, the greater the 
, ' 
.. 
celtainty with which we can state it will not occur. This will of course always be a 
defeasible judgement unless the probability is zero. In the case of probability zero, it is 
aCf'rrate to term this a low probability rather than non-probability. The probability can 
, ' 
be ·measured; the measurement happens to be zero. We can then characterize events of 
LP as tending towards O. The lower limit ofLP is thus easily established - it is O. Events 
with probability 0 do not occur; given that events with probability I MUST occur, it is 
symmetrical and unsU/prising that events with probability 0 CANNOT occur. The 
difficulty is in establishing the upper bound ofLP, which serves also as the demarcation 
betwecn LP and IP. 
An example of an event of low probability is the chance of the occurrence of 
thundershowers tomorrow being I %. This is the sort of probability that does not impact 
our behaviour at all. No one is liable to prepare for tomorrow raining in the light of a 1% 
forecast. In fact, I believe we would think somebody who prepared for it raining on the 
basis of such a probability irrational. It is so much more likely not to · rain than to rain 
that the most reasonable working assumption is that it will not rain. 
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It is to be noted that I have not attempted to establish what the boundary probabilities 
(between HP and IP; and IP and LP) are. As a working suggestion, I submit the 
following: that we draw these lines at 0.33 and 0.66. The logic behind this is simple - we 
divide the maximum probability (1) by the number of ranges (3, viz. HP, IP & LP) and 
assign the ranges accordingly. This is at best an artificial attempt to delineate the 
different propabilities, but renders a consistent position. Since the lines must be drawn 
s~mewhcre, I submit that these are the logical places to draw them. This, which I take to 
be the best account we can give, will nevertheless result in significant problems for 
Dembski's account, to be examined in Section 2.5. 
As previously indicated, Dembski ties probability ranges to specific modes of 
explanation. HP maps one-to-one on to regularity explanations; IP likewise maps on to 
chance explanations; and LP maps either on to chance explanations or on to design 
explanations (where specification is present). Dembski believes that assigning a high 
probability to an event is nothing short of ascribing its occurrence to regularity; and 
mutatis mutandi with intermediate and low probabilities. I turn now to examine what is 
entailed by these different explanatory mechanisms. 
2.4) Explanatory Mechanisms 
2.4.1) Regularity Explanations 
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A regularity explanation is most strongly simply an appeal to an established law of 
nature. To say that X occurred due to a regularity is simply to say that X had to happen, 
given the way that the world works and the conditions pertaining immediately before X's 
occurrence. This is the most robust form of explanation, since it provides a universal sort 
of explanation: for all or most X in the situation Y, X will occur due to a regularity. 
Given a regularity, there is no surprise inherent in X's occurring, given that X had to 
occur. Regularity explanations then deal with events whose chance of occurring tends 
tqwards I. For example, when I open a spring-loaded door, it slams shut ceteris paribus. 
I expect it to occur; and it must, given the laws governing force and motion. Since the 
d~or's shutting is perfectly explicable using non-intentional language, but is explicable 
b~; the lan~ge of physics, it is both unnecessary and explanatorily useless to appeal to 
chance or design to explain how the door shuts. Of course, why the door shuts can be 
explained in terms of my intention to move through it, or in terms of the designer's 
intention for it to be self-closing, but the actual mechanism of the door is sufficient to 
explain how it closes. We need not have recourse to a chance explanation - it somehow 
managed to shut itself because of these and those factors - nor to design explanations - it 
shut because Tommy, hiding behind the door, pulled it shut. 
However, it appears that this is not the entire story. Notice that I characterized regularity 
explanations as being applicable where something had to occur, given the conditions 
pertaining in the world. Immediately the criticism arises that something might occur due 
to regularity, but that the event did not have to occur in any strict sense. It is not as 
though these events are logically necessary; t11at they cannot not occur. Rather, given 
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what we know about the world, if conditions remain as they are, we expect that event to 
occur. If conditions change, it may well not occur; if they remain as is, the event must 
occur, given that we have correctly read the conditions and have made an accurate 
prediction of the consequences of such conditions pertaining. This last statement reveals 
a rather important element of design inferences - that the assignation of probabilities to 
events relies rather heavily on a correct human reading of conditions and correct 
predictions based thereon. Read the conditions incorrectly; and you make an incorrect 
prediction. Make an incon'ect prediction and you assign the wrong probability to an 
event occurring. Assign the wrong probability and you are liable to eliminate the wrong 
explanatory mechanism. This seems to be a weakness inherent in probabilistic reasoning 
arid explanatory theory generally, rather than specifically in Dembski's theory. However, 
he has not accounted for this and it leaves his thesis open to the self-same criticisms of 
inaccuracy as are leveled at competing theories. The mistake of course can run in either 
direction - it does not necessarily lead to the positing of design explanations in place of 
regularity or chance explanations. 
It might also not be obvious why regularity explanations trump chance and design 
explanations. Why ought regularity explanations first be sought? Are they preferable to 
other explanations? It is important to note that regularity explanations are synonymous 
with scientific explanations. Science demands a certain rigour in its theories and 
predictions that, of course, fits hand-in-glove with high probability. If we were to base 
our weather predictions on a chance or design explanation of why it rains, we would find 
ourselves constantly outwitted by the weather. An explanation for why an event must 
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always or usually occur is, due to the consistency of such events, going to be in itself a 
consistent explanation. 
Carl Hempel, the noted philosopher of science, argued in Philosophy of Natural Science34 
that scientific explanations, which he called deductive-nomological explanations or 
covcring laws, trump others in the following terms: 
D.e~uctive-nomological explanations satisfY the requirement of explanatory relevance I 
the strongest possiblc sense: the explanatory information they provide implies the 
explanandum sentence deductively and thus offers logically conclusive grounds why the 
cxplanadum phcnomcnon is to be cxpected. 
Hempcl freely admits that not all scientific explanations fit this model; but as tlus is the 
scientific norm and if it is true that scientific explanations logically necessarily entail the 
occurrence of the event wlder examination, then it is clear why scientific or regularity 
explanations must trump 'mere' inferences. 
2.4.2) Chance Explanations 
Chance explanations are, after regularities, the most robust. If a regUlarity is not 
operating such as to make X, the event under consideration, come about, then we next 
look to chance to provide an explanation. Chance events have intermediate or small 
J4 Hempel, C. G.; Philosophy orNatural Science; Prentice-Hal1, Englewood Cliffs (1966). 
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probabilities of occurring. They cannot have a high probability of occurring, since that 
would render them regularities. Chance is the proper mode of explanation where neither 
a regularity nor design can be invoked. So, if our dice come up seven the first time we 
throw them in a game of craps, we attribute this to chance. Given that we believe the 
dice to be fair, and given that the chance of the dice turning up seven is 1 in 6, it is not 
sensible either to believe that they had to come up seven, nor that they were subject to 
human intervention. Chance adequately accounts for the occurrence, since 1 in 6 is the 
sort of odds we do not find to be either so small as to suggest design or so large as to 
indicate a certainty. 
. . 
A \further example is useful. In a theoretical lottery, we at times may see advertised a 
prize amount of, say, twelve million Rand. Tickets cost two and a half Rand apiece, 
which is to say that when the jackpot is at RI2 000 000, four million eight hundred 
thousand tickets have been sold. Consider that you hold one such ticket. You might think 
that you have a 1 in 4 800 000 chance of winning - a pretty slim chance. In fact, the 
chance of your winning is not based on how many tickets have been purchased, since the 
winning number is not drawn from the pool of tickets sold. Rather, a random number 
generator (the ubiquitous air-driven ball selector) produces a six-digit number. This is the 
winning number. When purchasing one's ticket, one chooses six numbers (from 1 to 49) 
and writes them on the ticket. If the numbers drawn match the numbers you chose, you 
win. If more than one person has the numbers correctly, then the jackpot is divided 
equally between them. 
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This convolution in effect means that one's chance of winning the lottery when the prize 
amount is at RI2 000 000 is 1 in 10068347520. This is calculated as follows: 49 x 48 x 
47 x 46 x 45 x 44 (since the same number cannot be selected twice). So were one to win, 
the winning would be an event of incredibly small probability. However, a chance 
explanation is still, it is submitted, the best to account for one's winning. After all, if 
anyone were to win, the chances of your winning (unless you or other persons had 
multiple tickets, which for the purposes of the example is prohibited) are as good as 
~yone else's. So it is much less surprising - were you to win - that you won and not 
someone else - the chance being I in 4 800 000. In fact, it is not much less surprising 
than that someone won at all- since the chance of there even being a winning ticket is at 
worst I in 2097 (that is, 10 068 347 520 possible winning combinations divided by 4800 
000 possible combinations actually chosen). In other words, the chances of a winning 
ticket being purchased, in this example, are 1 in 2097. Although the difference in the 
odds is large, all are the sorts of events that we ascribe to chance - one hopes that one's 
lucky number will come up; and it is not surprising, considering that everyone who 
purchases a ticket has a lucky number that they hope will come up, that someone's lucky 
number really turns out to be "lucky". That is all it is - brute luck; or, in other words, 
mere chance. 
2.4.3) Design Explanations 
When an event X has failed to be explained either by regularity or by chance, then, due to 
the exhaustive and exclusive nature of our explanatory apparatuses, design is by 
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elimination the proper mode of explaining X. Design explanations are only called on 
when the probability of X' s happening is so small as to necessarily preclude regularity. 
That is to say that the chance ofX's happening must not ' tend towards' 1 for design to be 
invoked in its explanation. Neither should it 'tend towards' 0.5. In fact, according to the 
discussion on LP, the probability must tend towards O. Now, many things of exceedingly 
small probability happen all the time and it would seem absurd to attribute all of them to 
design. The chance of any given ticket being drawn in a lottery with 10 000 000 entries 
is.! only I in 10 000 000; that is the chance that my ticket will be drawn and it is the 
chance that is realised by the winning tickd' . The chance that a (winning) ticket will be 
drawn is of course 1 (that is, 1 in 1), since a ticket must be drawn. What this example 
sh~ws is thai, although the chance of any given ticket being drawn is in subjective terms 
very small (I in 10 000 000, the latter certainly being a large number in any non-
scientific use), the event is nonetheless perfectly explicable in terms of chance (after all, 
some ticket had to be drawn). So there must be some further fuctor distinguishing events 
of small probability due to design from events of small probability due to chance. This 
factor is that of information content or patterned complexity. Dembski terms this 
specification. The best characterization of this is in terms of algorithms. The length of 
the shortest possible algorithm that can reproduce a pattern (as it occurs, in this case, in 
an event or object) measures information content. The longer the algorithm, the less 
complexly patterned the event or object. At first glance this seems counter-intuitive -
surely the longer the algorithm, the more the information content and the greater the 
35 The lottery I am imagining is one where 10 000 000 tickets are available and all have been sold, on the 
basis of one ticket only per person. The winner is selected by drawing out a single ticket from amongst all 
the entries, all being in a large rotating drum. 
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patterned complexity? However, this is not so: consider the algorithm that would capture 
each of the following 'sequences' of dice rolls: 
I) 2,4,6,8,10,12,2,4,6,8,10,12,2,4,6,8,10,12,2,4,6,8, 10, 12, 
2,4,6,8, 10, 12,2,4,6,8,10,12,2,4,6,8,10,12,2,4,6,8,10,12, 
2,4,6,8, 10, 12,2,4,6,8,10,12,2,4, 6,8, 10, 12,2,4,6,8,10,12, 
2,4, 6, 8, 10,12,2,4,6,8,10,12,2, 4,6, 8,10,12,2,4,6,8, 10, 12. 
2) 2,3,2,5,2,7,2, 11,2,3,2,5,7, 11,2,3,5,2,7,11,2,3,2,5,2,7,2,11, 
2,3,2,5,2,7,2,11,2,3,2,5,7,11,2,3,5,2,7,11,2,3,2,5,2,7,2,11, 
. . 
\ 2, 3,2,5,2, 7,2,11,2,3,2,5,7,11,2,3,5,2,7,11,2,3,2,5,2,7,2,11, 
2, 3,2,5,2,7,2,11,2,3,2,5, 7,11,2,3,5,2,7, 11,2,3,2,5,2,7, 2,11. 
3) 6,8,9,4,3,10,7,5,7,5,4,11,7,9,10,12,7,8,8,8,3,6,5, 7, 9, 5, 5, 9, 
6,10,8,8, 11,5,12,8,9,7,5,7,6,7,10,10,6,11,3,12,10,5,7,7,7,6. 
In the case of (1) and (2), I simply wrote down actual mathematical sequences of 
"throws"; (3) I obtained by physically rolling two dice that I presume to be fair (they 
were expensive dice; and furthermore, they were marked not with pips but with numerals 
- considered better as pips weight a die such that it tends to fall with "6" showing). The 
shortest verbal 'algorithms' that will capture these 'sequences are', respectively: 
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4) Two followed by the first five succeeding even numbers, the whole repeated sixteen 
times. 
5) Two alternating with the first four succeeding prime numbers, the whole repeated 
sixteen times. 
6) Six, eight, nine, four, three, ten, seven, five, seven, five, four, eleven, seven, nine, ten, 
,I twelve, seven, eight, eight, eight, three, six, five, seven, nine, five, five, nine, six, ten, 
eight, eight, eleven, five, twelve, eight, nine, seven, five, seven, six, seven, ten, ten, 
six, eleven, three, twelve, ten, five, seven, seven, seven, and six. 
In the case of the two artificial sequences, they are easily communicated to some third 
party person who on the basis of this communication could accurately reconstruct the 
sequence of 'throws' as I have them. There is no need to repeat to them the entire 
sequence of numbers to accurately reconstruct the said sequences. In the case of the third 
'sequence', however, there is no visible pattern (none visible to me at any rate), and 
therefore no obvious way of producing an algorithm that will allow for accurate 
reconstruction of that 'sequence'. It is necessary to repeat the entire 'sequence'. What 
this shows is that the more patterned a given event or object, the shorter the "algorithm" 
that describes it. In fact, this is even more obvious when one notes that the third 
'sequence' is only half as long as the first two, yet has a longer description. 
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Daniel Dennett in 1991 wrote a seminal paper on patterns titled (in the imaginative 
fashion of philosophers) Real Patterns. It is to Dennett that we owe the notion of 
patterning in order to describe what we observe (although the notion is itself much older 
than that, it is patterning of the Dennettian sort that we are interested in). Dennett 
employs the concept of the pattern in his quest to drive a middle road through the 
polalities of modem ontology, namely realism and eliminative matelialism. Dennett's 
project is not our current concern; but the tools that he made to craft his argument are 
in~nitely useful. 
In " order to describe what he means (and thus what I mean) by the description of 
infonnation by means of an algorithm, which is shorter when a pattern exists in the 
infonnation, Dennett sets up the example of the bar code. The bar code is simply a set of 
printed dots (pixels), consisting often rows of ninety dots. The ninety dots are printed as 
ten black dots then ten white dots, the whole sequence being repeated. The result is that a 
single printing of "bar code" yields a row of five black blocks separated by four white 
blocks. This, Dennett puts it to us, is easily recognised as a pattern. More explanation is 
not needed - its strikes us intuitively as a pattern; things that look like that are called 
patterns. Dennett then introduces some (pseudo-) random "noise" into the pattern. He 
presents six sets (called frames) of bar code peppered with noise at percentages ranging 
from 1 to 50. With 1 % noise, some white dots appear in the black blocks and vice versa -
but so few as to allow the pattern to be still very easily distinguished. At other 
intennediate noise percentages, the pattern remains clearly discernible underneath the 
noise. At 50% interference, however, the pattern (as one might well deduce) is no longer 
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apparent at all. In fact, there is only noise. In order for the reader to reproduce graphically 
the pattern of bar code without having seen Dennett's paper, it is necessary only to read 
the description I gave above. In order to reproduce graphically the noisy sets of bar code, 
it will take more description. The description I give is certainly shorter than typing out a 
picture of 900 dots - if only because I did not expend 900 words on that initial 
description. Yet the reader could quite accurately reproduce the bar code from the 
description. In order to reproduce bar code with I % noise I need only add to the 
de~cription that the dots are to be numbered descriptively from left to right from I 
upwards, reverting to the left of the second row for dot number 91, the left of the third 
row for dot 181 and so forth. Now I need mention that, say, dots 1, 26,34, 55, 58 etc are 
the\ opposite colour to what they should be; and the reader will be able to accurately 
reproduce bar code with the same I % interference as Dennett. To produce bar code with 
simply I % noise (that is, with any 9 dots reversed in colour) is even simpler. 
Exactly reproducing bar code with 50% noise is a different proposition altogether, for 
after the description of the pattern, no less than 450 dots must be indicated as being 
reversed in colour. In other words, the description of bar code is going to be nearly as, as 
long as, or longer than a 900 dot, dot by dot representation of the bar code - in other 
words, an exact duplicate of the picture. As Dennett puts it: 
"A series (of dots or numbers or whatever) is random if and only if the information 
required to describe (transmit) the series accurately is incompressible: nothing 
shorter than the verbatim bit map will preserve the series. Then a series is not 
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random - has a pattern - if and only if there is some more efficient way of 
describing it. 
A pattern exists in some data - is real - if there is a description of the data that is 
more efficient than the bit map, whether anyone can concoct it. Compression 
algorithms, as general-purpose pattern describers, arc efficient ways of transmitting 
exact copies of (bar code):' 
What work does this do in the design inference? The existence of a pattern in a set of 
data (referring to some or other event or object) of small probability calls for explanation. 
In the case o~ a long-algorithm event, no explanation other than chance is possible. As 
! 
seen in the dice-throwing example, the long-algorithm event is simply a chance 
occurrence: the sequence in fuct was derived from a random process of actual dice 
throwing. The short-algorithm events - the patterned events - were not the result of 
chance. This was obvious at first glance; the utility of the reduction to algorithms is that 
it allows us to detect design in cases less clear-cut than my dice sequences. This is in 
other words a method of detecting specification. The shorter the shortest possible 
algorithmic reduction of some large set of data, the more specified is the data. A further 
example will illustrate the validity ofthis reasoning. 
2.4.4) The Morse Code Example 
Contact is lost with an Allied merchantman on the high seas in 1940. Unbeknownst to 
British Naval Intelligence, a German Q-ship has captured the steamer in question. A 
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prize crew is put aboard with orders to make for the nearest friendly port. The former 
crew is held below decks. The British begin a search using aircraft and ships over a large 
area of ocean centred on the last known co-ordinates of the merchantman. Eventually 
one of the searchers picks up certain noises, call them X, on their radio-direction finder. 
X at face value is a random series of short and long sounds. They can be represented as 
follows: 
.. , --.. - -.-- -. --- .-. -.-.. - .--..... - .-.. -.. -.-.. -... -- .--.. -...... --- -. . 
• - •• 0. 
As 'a civilian, one may think X to be nothing more than what it appears: a random set of 
noises, such as are carried over the ether at all times. However, on the basis of this 
sequence of sounds, the Allied forces converge on the position of the ship, knowing that 
it had not sunk and was in enemy hands. How so? The apparent series of meaningless 
sounds was actually a message in Morse code, tapped out on the hull of the merchantman 
by the imprisoned crew. It reads as follows: 
"SOS. Gaynor captured. Crew prisoners." 
What does this example purport to show? It is an instance of the design inference at 
work; and since it is one based on the everyday experience of real people, it can hardly be 
debated that the design inference has a real application. I will work through the example 
through answering three questions: 
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a) Has X occurred, such that it is in need of explanation? 
b) Is the probability of X occurring a small probability? 
c) Is X specified? 
a) .' As the example is set up, X has occurred; and in a situation (wartime) where the sort 
of thing that X is (a series of sounds canied over the ether), is in need of investigation 
(explanation). 
b) Given all the sequences of 82 dots and dashes36 in combination that are possible, the 
odds of this particular combination occWTing are I in 6724. That is to say that any 
given combination of 82 dots and dashes has probability I in 6724 of occurring. 
These odds are significantly small - perhaps small enough to itself discount 
regularity; and since there is no match between the realised combination and any 
expected natural sequence of sounds (say, whale song), we are licensed to appeal to 
either chance or design as explanations. Regularity is excluded. 
c) Given a working knowledge of Morse code, it is possible to substitute letters for the 
dots and dashes picked up by the searchers. The substitution turns out to make a 
sensible sentence in English - one that is not only intelligible, but is contextually 
appropriate. Given that very few such substitutions of letters into sequences of radio 
36 By dots and dashes I am of course here referring to short and long sounds, as represented ahove. 
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noise will result in intelligible, appropriate English sentences, this event is different in 
kind to events of an otherwise similar nature. Given that the substitution ofletters for 
the noises renders fewer bits than in the entire bitmap (the original message; 37 
characters in place of 82), there is a considerable amount of informational content in 
X. Previously I discussed the existence of patterns where I argued that informational 
content is directly proportional to compressibility. The current example is just such an 
instance of significantly compressed informational content. With these two 
! considerations in mind, it can be seen that X is specified. 
Given that X meets the three conditions necessary to carry through an inference to 
de~ign, the Admiralty despatches a cruiser to recapture the merchantman. That the 
warship indeed finds the steamer and finds it to be in German hands and finds the 
merchant sailors in the hold, is proof that the design inference is warranted in this case. 
If the design inference works in at least one case - as it does - then we have prima facie 
evidence ofthe validity of the inference. As it is, this sort of example occurs frequently -
the situation sketched above is typical of rescue missions of all types. It is the same 
principle that leads helicopters to drop winch ropes near square metre patches of orange 
in the forest. Although it is entirely possible that somewhere in the vast coniferous 
forests of the north there is a full square metre of orange fungi growing on the ground in a 
place visible to aerial observation, the better and more probable explanation is that it is 
the lost hiker's safety jacket. 
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2.5) Formal Statement of The Design Argument 
Dembski gives us a symbolic fonnulation ofthe argumene7, that I shall call (A): 
1) oc(E) 
2) sp(E) 
3) ch(E) -> SP(E) 
4) ; VX[ oc(X) & sp(X) & SP(X) -> - ch(X) 1 
5) - reg(E) 
6) reg(E) V ch(E) V des (E) 
7) ,des(E) 
Legend 
oc = occurred 
E = event 
sp = specification 
ch = chance 
-> = then 
SP = small probability 
V = for all X 
X=anyE 
- =not 
J7 Dembski; The Design Inference; pg. 49. 
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reg = regularity 
des = design 
From this, claims Dembski, we see that the inference to design constitutes a valid 
argument within the first-order predicate logic38• It indeed is a valid deductive argument, 
given the exhaustive nature of the explanatory mechanisms Dembski entertains>9. This 
then is strong evidence for the usefulness of the design inference as a means of 
explanation. Events or phenomena can be substituted for E and it can be formally 
established whether or not they are the result of design. It will be noted that the 
argument, both in its formal and informal instantiations, does not make any mention of 
the\ identity or nature of the designer in tum responsible for the design. It in fact makes 
no statement at all regarding possible candidates for the role of designer. There is good 
reason for this, which I shall examine in the following section. 
For further reference, an abbreviated form (B) of the three main conditions for a valid 
design inference is as follows, where premise (3) assumes and encapsulates premises (3) 
to (6) offormulation (A)40: 
(l) if oc(E) 
38 Ibidem. 
39 My thanks go to Dr Ward E. Jones of the Rhodes University Philosophy Department for establishing this. 
As I indicate in the textual rider, however, the validity of the argument only holds presupposing the 
exhaustive nature of the premises. Dr Jones pointed this out too. The inference may still be vacuous, even 
given the valid formulation advanced by Dembski. At worst the argument then is formally valid, but false. 
40 This is not meant as a formulation within the norms of symbolic logic. It is merely a brief description of 
the steps to be taken in an event's examination such that we could legitimately conclude that design is the 
proper mode of explanation for that event. To that effect it may be helpful to the general reader who, like 
myself, is not at home with fomlallogic. 
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2.5) Formal Statement of The Design Argument 
Dembski gives us a symbolic formulation of the argumenr7, that I shall call (A): 
I) oc(E) 
2) sp(E) 
3) ch(E) -> SP(E) 
4) ( VX[ oc(X) & sp(X) & SP(X) -> - ch(X)] 
5) - reg(E) 
6) reg(E) V ch(E) V des (E) 
7) \ des(E) 
Legend 
oc = occurred 
E = event 
sp = specification 
ch = chance 
-> = then 
SP = small probability 
V = for all X 
X =any E 
- =not 
37 Dembski; The Design Inference; pg. 49. 
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(2) and sp(E) 
(3) and SP(E) 
(4) then des(E). 
2.6) Objections to Dembski 
It is appropriate at this point to consider objections to Dembski from various sources. As 
I h;ave previously indicated, it does not lie within the scope of this dissertation to treat 
extensively the metaphysical positions undergirding Intelligent Design and its 
explanatory competitors. However, that there are legitimate concerns that can be 
< 
expressed regarding Dembski's work is not to be ignored. Although the everyday use of 
the design inference cannot be denied; and although its efficacy cannot be denied; 
Dembski's particular formulation of the inference is open to dispute. It would be 
surprising were it otherwise, given the opposing metaphysical positions informing 
different views of the explanatory apparatuses available to us. 
Sober, Stephens and Fitelson argue that Dembski does not have grounds on which to treat 
the design explanation differently to chance and regularity explanations41 . More 
importantly, they think that Dembski throws the baby out with the bath water42• The 
design filter requires that not only a specific regularity explanation be discounted in order 
to get to design, but that all regularity explanations be so discounted. Yet if we are 
unaware of a particular regularity explanation that nonetheless exists, we cannot reject it; 
41 Fitelson. B., Stephens, C. and Sober, E.; "How Not to Detect Design - Critical Notice: William A. 
Dembski, The Design Inference"; in Philosophy of Science. 66 (September 1999). 
42 Ibidem pg. 479. 
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and if we move on to call on design, we may, despite Debmski ' s best intentions to tbe 
contrary, obtain false positive instances of'design'. We can easily negotiate our way out 
of tbis apparent trap - when Demsbki claims tbat his filter cannot output false positives, 
he claims too much. He need not even claim tbis - much as Behe is later shown to do, 
Dembski stretches his case a little too far and a little needlessly. It is enough for the 
design filter to produce mainly positive results for it to be useful; and it is enough given 
the characterisation of design inferences as inferences to tbe best explanations, not as tbe 
golden road to definite explanations. 
I first took issue witb Dembski, in Section 2.3.3, regarding his use of tbe term "small 
prcibability" in place of the more fitting 'low probability'. I further took issue witb 
Dembski, on more general groW1ds, in Section 2.4.1 regarding tbe explanatory filter and 
the errors it may generate. However, the concerns seem minor given tbe general 
robustness of Dembski's accoW1t. Sober et aI's criticism is more damaging, but if we 
look at tbe design filter less rigorously tban Dembski might like and see tbat it is a form 
of inference to the best explanation, tben tbere is little problem in Dembski's accoW1t. 
2.7) Conclusion of the Design Argument 
As briefly alluded to in tbe discussion on tbe formal statement of the argument, tbe 
conclusion of the inference to design is not tbat God exists. The conclusion oftbe design 
inference is not tbat tbe Christian God exists, nor tbat a monotbeistic god exists nor 
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indeed that any god or gods exists. It should be obvious from the formal statement of the 
argument that any event E - in other words, X (from Section 2.5) - is a candidate for 
being explained by the design inference. The process by which certain events are filtered 
out ensures that if the correct method of explanation is regularity or chance, then X is 
duly assigned the appropriate explanation and does not fall under the head of design. 
However, it is also difficult to assign the correct explanations to events in the light of it 
be.ing difficult to assign the correct probability ranges to events. Although false positives 
ought not to be generated, due to the specification requirement, there is no such guarantee 
regarding false negatives. It appears that Dembski's account makes light of the difficulty 
in \assigning probabilities and by allowing false negatives weakens the explanatory 
efficacy ofthe inference to design. 
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3) THE NEW EVIDENCE FROM BIOLOGY: MICHAEL 
BEHE AND IRREDUCIBLE COMPLEXITY 
3.1) Introduction to the Chapter 
In this section I discuss the biological argument for design propounded by Michael 
Behe43. Behe is a biochemist of some repute who argues that at the biochemical level 
there is evidence of design; that is to say that certain phenomena at that level are only 
I 
explicable in tenus of design. Behe bases his argument on the concept of irreducible 
complexity. I will examine what is entailed in this concept, Behe's application of it and 
some criticisms of his position. 
\ 
3.2) Functional Explanation or Irreducible Complexity 
Before treating Behe's distinctive notion of irreducible complexity I shall briefly explain 
what I mean by functional explanation, a concept to which I shall constantly refer. A 
system is explanatorily irreducible if and only if explanatory reduction is no longer 
possible without forfeiting the applicability of the explanans to the explanandum. This is 
to say that a further, lower level of explanation is not possible. The base level of 
explanation is irreducibly complex if it exhibits a level of patterning sufficient to be 
termed 'complex' , but admitting of no further explanatory reduction. This is not to say 
that the events, phenomena or objects are not further physically reducible. However, 
., Behe; Darwin's B lack Box 
68 
further physical reduction will be at the cost of the explanatory effectiveness of the 
explanans. This is best illustrated by example. 
Behe argues that there exist certain biochemical systems, in humans for example, that are 
irreducibly complex. One example he uses is that of the blood-clotting, or coagulation, 
system. This system is comprised of various chemical components, to which individual 
components the system is physically reducible. However, no further explanatory 
re~uction is possible. Although one might reduce the chemical components to their 
constituent atoms and then to the smaller particles constituting atoms and so forth, one 
would lose all explanatory efficacy. The reason is simple enough - at this level, there is 
no \longer any applicability to biology, since we are now dealing with physics. The 
constituent atoms are not sufficiently differentiated from the atoms constituting anything 
else for an explanation in these terms to be helpful in elucidating the way blood clots. 
This then is what I mean by reduction at the cost of explanatory effectiveness. The 
explanation of any system must retain relevance to the function of that system; otherwise 
it is no explanation at all of how that system works, but simply another 'black box'. This 
is a standard anti-reductionist move and is also seen in the work of philosophers hostile to 
the notion of intelligent design. Michael Ruse for instance argues to this effect in his 
1989 collection of essays, The Darwinian Paradigm44. Ruse offers some interesting 
insights into the teleological nature of biology that offer support to my independent 
thesis. My thesis is that the modem evidence for design coming from biology is in one 
important sense different to the old evidence available to Paley and cohorts. It is 
44 Ruse, M.; The Darwinian Paradigm; 
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different in so far as orthodox biological science can no longer hold out hope for a total 
reduction of explanation such as to exclude design, as design exists at the most basic 
explanatory level available to biology. My claim is that Michael Behe and others 
working at the biochemical level are working at the lowest possible level of explanatory 
reduction that can accommodate function. That is to say that, although further reduction 
is possible - to the molecular level, to the stuff of physics, atoms and electrons and quarks 
and so forth - such reduction would, from the point of view of biology, be explanatorily 
us~less since it excludes mention of life. At this level, evolutionary mechanisms cannot 
maintain a grip, since evolution requires living organisms of some description to work 
on. That we should not and indeed cannot appeal to physics; that we cannot escape the 
teleological aspect of biological organisms, is well illustrated by Ruse in the following 
passage, which I feel is worth quoting at length. I address points as they are made by 
Ruse; his comments are indented. Please note that omitted portions of text, as indicated 
by ellipsis, are simply elaborations of points I feel him to state clearly enough in the 
included portions. 
"The most striking thing about animals and plants, separating them from rocks and 
lakes and so forth, is that in some sense they work ... Organisms do not survive and 
reproduce just by chance. They do so because their various features contribute to 
their possessors' success ... Seeing, swimming, converting sunlight, these are all 
things that organisms do to keep going .. . Thus, in dealing with the organic world, 
you can ask what 'function' or 'purpose' a part or process plays, meaning how does 
it serve the end of survival and reproduction. Since rocks and lakes do not survive 
and reproduce (as self-subsisting, energy using entities) you do not ask about the 
70 
' . 
ends served by their parts. This end-directed thinking and language about organisms 
is known as 'teleology' ... "" 
Here Ruse quite clearly brings out the applicability of speaking in teleological tenns 
about the biological sphere and how the physical - by that I mean the non-biologically 
physical - is different in kind to the biological. Suitable explanations in physics do not 
necessarily make suitable explanations in biology. 
"No one seriously active in science today supposes that the stuff of organisms differs 
in any significant way from the stuff of inorganic matter. Proportions are different, 
of course, but everything quick and dead is made up of molecules, which are in tum 
made up of the same kinds of atoms, and so on. Moreover, today the physical and 
biological sciences are increasingly being brought into contact, as concepts and 
theories from the first domain are applied fruitfully to the second ... But what about 
teleology? Is this something necessarily distinctive of biology, or will it vanish with 
the success of the physical sciences? My surmise is that there is something 
distinctive about teleological understanding, and that therefore it will not fade away. 
Or at least, if it were to fade away, something would be lost. As one who has long 
championed the influences of physico-chemical models of biology, 1 do not deny 
that non-teleological analyses of organic phenomena can be given. I accept for 
instance that much fruitful effort has been devoted to the non-teleological 
explication of goal-directedness. But, I would argue that if it is insisted that, in the 
future, only non-teleological analyses be given, then something important in our 
present understanding in biology would be 10st...1 doubt, however, that there is 
45 Ruse; The Darwinian Paradigm; pg. 
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much danger of this loss happening. As the physical sciences have moved into 
biology, it is they who have had to do the accommodating! There has been no 
question of eliminating teleology. Rather, the new molecular biology has taken it up 
with vigour. The notion of a genetic code is as artefact-like as anything in traditional 
biological science. Molecular genetics emphasizes the distinctive, end-fixated 
nature ofthe organic world . It does not deny it."" 
Obviously, the conclusion that Ruse reaches is not that intelligent design is the correct 
I 
approach to explaining (apparent) irreducible complexity in living organisms. Intelligent 
design in its present incarnation did not yet exist at the time of Ruse's writing these 
comments. However, he clearly supports the metaphysical idea underlying intelligent 
\ 
design, namely that the language and point of teleology is pertinent to biological 
explanation. This is an important step, since it is exactly the opposite view that holds 
predominance in science currently. This orthodoxy excludes intelligent design because it 
excludes - without much reason - teolology in biology altogether. 
As talk of teleology is nothing but talk of purpose, or function, we see that there is a 
proper place for theories that follow a teleological line in biology. Indeed, if we are to 
account for the existence of functional systems at all, then we need to follow such a line. 
Ruse points this out clearly; Behe produces such an end-directed account of biological 
systems; and I agree with both that this is necessary and something particularly suited to 
biology, ifnot to physical explanations in general. 
46 Ibidelll. 
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3.3) Irreducible Complexity 
It remains fully to explain the concept of an irreducibly complex system, now that we at 
least know what explanatory irreducibility is. Explaining irreducible complexity is best 
done in Behe's own words: 
"By irreducibly complex I mean a single system composed of several well-matched, 
interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, wherein the removal of anyone 
of the parts causes the system to effectively cease functioning."" 
His example is that of a mousetrap, which requires a number of disparate parts to work; 
and without every part of which it would cease to function4s. The attached diagrammatic 
depiction is Behe's own49• 
47 Behe; Darwin's Black Box; pg. 39. 
48 Behe is of course referring to that particular item that we call a mousetrap, not to any thing that might 
catch mice and so in a broad sense be termed a mousetrap. 
49 Bche; Darwin's Black Box; pg. 
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The mousetrap requires a platform to which the other parts can be attached; without a 
stable base, the other parts would not stay together in such a way as to trap a mouse, if 
they stayed together at all. A collection of loose body panels, mechanical components, 
electrical components, glass, rubber and so forth only constitutes a motor vehicle once 
assembled. In order to assemble the motor vehicle, a chassis is required as a base 
(presuming the vehicle is not of monocoque construction). Likewise, the platform 
constitutes the base of the mousetrap and ensures that the trap can hold together over a 
pe,nod of time and even given the interference ofa mouse. 
A trigger is also required in order to set the trap offwhen a mouse interferes with it. If 
thd trap would not go off, the mouse quite obviously would not be caught. It may happen 
that without a trigger mechanism, the trap would occasionally work just by sheer chance. 
However, that is not good enough. None of us would buy a mousetrap that the sales 
assistant assured us would work, but only on occasion; and then only once every two 
years (say) on average. The trigger is required for the trap to work every time; granted, it 
may malfunction now and again, but clearly a mousetrap that malfunctions once in two 
years on average is a better mousetrap than one that only functions once every two years. 
The latter type will have a sales life approaching nothing; the former has been on the 
market for decades and will no doubt continue to be. I need not stress the obvious 
parallel to evolutionary thinking here, as regards natural selection operating as much in 
the market place as in nature (if such a principle exists in nature). 
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The mousetrap also requires a hammer with which to pin the mouse and a spring with 
which to propel the hammer. It is simply useless for a platform to have a trigger mounted 
on it that in turn connects to nothing. Imagine a nation going to war and equipping its 
troops with guns without barrels and bullets - every time an enemy approached, the 
trooper would press his trigger and nothing would happen .. .leaving the enemy soldier an 
open shot. Such a gun would not long equip any army; certainly, any army that 
continued to issue such ordnance soon would be annihilated in modern combat. 
Likewise, the mousetrap must have both a hammer ('bullet') to strike the mouse and a 
spring ('barrel') with which to impart the suitable velocity and hitting power to the 
hammer. Otherwise, on triggering the trap, the mouse could run off happily with the 
proverbial cheese. Notice too that in our analogy, if the barrel of the gun was not of a 
sufficient length and the bullet of a sufficient weight, the enemy would not really be 
harmed. (Air rifles are an example of guns with bullets too small to really harm people). 
So it is with the hammer and spring of the mousetrap. If the hammer is not large enough 
to trap a significant part of the mouse; or if the spring is not hard enough to keep the 
hammer down against the struggles of the mouse; then the trap fails to 'trap' the mouse. 
A mouse that is hit by the hammer but then runs off is not 'trapped' . Thus it is not only 
the nature of the parts of the trap that are important, but also certain of the exact 
properties ofthose parts and the various relationships between the parts. 
The mousetrap then requires at the very least all of these parts; otherwise it is not a trap 
properly so-called at all. An item that is named ' trap' but fails to perform as a trap is an 
instance of misdescription. It is the performance of the trap that counts; any combination 
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of the parts described above that lacks but one of the parts will fail to perform as a trap; 
any combination of even all of these parts that does not have the correct set of properties 
in each part and their interrelationships will fail to perform as a trap. Any such set of 
components would be a failed mousetrap. The mousetrap exhibits irreducible complexity 
as far as its function is concerned (it can be reduced to molecules and an explanation of 
its working given in terms of physics, but that would not make a mousetrap minus a part 
function at all, let alone any better). In fact, Behe can make his case much stronger with 
th.e example of the mousetrap. Without every part, it would not even be a mousetrap, but 
simply a collection of unrelated parts. One cannot label anything a 'mousetrap' simply 
because one designates that the object so named is a mousetrap. To be a mousetrap, the 
object has to trap mice - by definition. Be that as it may, we have to agree with Behe that 
the mousetrap exhibits irreducible complexity on his definition. It is certainly the case 
that if we remove the hammer (for instance), the trap would cease to function. 
What are the implications of irreducible complexity for an explanatory history of the 
system? Imagine for a moment that artifacts (a mousetrap is an artifact) can evolve by 
the gradual natural selection offortuitous random mutations. In the case of an irreducibly 
complex artifact such as the mousetrap, such a mechanism could not work. At any point 
previous to that incorporating all the parts of the trap (viz. base, trigger, hammer & 
spring) a precursor system would not function at all. A collection of three parts (say, 
trigger, hammer and spring) could not possibly perform the function of catching mice; it 
is difficult in fact to imagine such a "system" performing any function at all. Now, given 
that the parts arise singly (say, the trigger, then the spring and then the hammer), there 
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would be a number of such precursor systems that would need to exist in order for a 
fully-fledged mousetrap to eventually evolve - in fuct, there would have to be at least 
three such intermediate stages (trigger; then trigger + spring; then trigger + spring + 
hammer) before the system fmally existed in a functioning state (trigger + spring + 
hammer + base). Yet each and every one of these precursor states would be functionless; 
that is, they would be unable to catch mice. One would expect the system to be 
deselected very quickly due to its uselessness. In simple terms, were mice the food of 
mousetraps, mousetraps having less than the full complement of parts would starve into 
extinction. The implication then is that there can exist no direct path of evolution in the 
Darwinian sense leading to an irreducibly complex system. Any possible precursor 
. .. 
system would not survive as it could not function; so there can be no precursor systems 
which lead via slight modifications to the system sought to be explained. 
Behe, having established that irreducible complexity exists at least in principle, wishes to 
argue that certain living organisms exhibit irreducible complexity, at least at some level. 
It might be thought that Behe cannot argue analogously from the mousetrap, simply 
because it differs in a vital respect from living organisms, viz. that it is not living. Yet he 
simply uses the mousetrap to show that the concept of irreducible complexity is valid and 
in fact, apart from asking us to suspend our disbeliefwith regard to artifacts being able to 
evolve, the analogy maps on to instances of apparent design in nature. At least, we must 
make this our point of departure if we are to make sense of what Behe is claiming. 
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What does Behe then do to show that the concept is applicable to living organisms? He 
presents a series of complex biochemical examples, which are intelligible but couched in 
rather technical terms. They perform the function of showing, ostensibly, that there are 
systems in humans, for example, that are irreducibly complex, such as the blood-clotting 
system mentioned earlicr. The blood-clotting system is usually rcferred to as the clotting 
cascade, because clotting relies on a number of steps rolling into each other. Not only is 
there a causal chain - one protein activating another and the second protein in tum 
as!iYating the next - but the system is self-referential. Some proteins apparently need to 
be activated by proteins they in fact themselves activate! 
Pe'rl~aps further explanation of this particular system is called for at this point. The 
example is highly technical; but the point it makes is difficult to ignore through the 
system's very complication. I will give a very simplified version of the sorts of things 
that happen when the blood clotting system starts its essential work. 
Whilst on tour with the cricket team, you cut your finger in attempting to slice some 
biltong. The skin is pierced and a blood vessel is ruptured. Being a liquid, and liquids 
always toll owing the path ofleast resistance, your blood begins to pour out of the wound. 
If it continued to do this, you would bleed to death. If you simply sealed the flesh, 
internal bleeding would still result in your death. It is necessary for the body to deal with 
stopping the flow of blood out of the blood vessel itself. The best way to do this is 
simply to solidiJY the blood - solids do not flow. There is a slight problem here, though. 
If the entire blood system began solidiJYing, very soon you would die from lack of 
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oxygen, since the function of the blood is to carry oxygen to the brain and muscles. So, 
the clotting process must be localized to the area of the cut. The blood clotting system 
must then identifY the exact location of the opening in the wall of the blood vessel and 
close the hole, without either soliditying the entire system OR blocking the blood vessel 
in question with a large clot. The latter course would lead to losing the affected limb or 
even to cardiac arrest in the case of a major vessel. After identitying the location of the 
wound, then, the clotting system must seal only the wall of the blood vessel at that place. 
As it happens, a certain protein (call it A) identifies the cut, activating another protein 
(call it B) which in tum activates protein C and so on. The catch is that protein (say) F is 
a1s'o needed to activate protein B, which performs a dual function in the system. In other 
words, the system has a interdependent parts built into it. Some proteins have multiple 
tasks, being needed to activate another protein that in tum activates the original activating 
protein to perform another function. If the system evolved step by step, proteins A and F 
would have to arise simultaneously in order for protein B to be useful. However, apart 
from its use in activating protein B, protein F has no function or purpose for existing until 
proteins C, D and E exist. Even then, proteins G through Z are necessary for the full 
process of clotting to occur without killing you in the process. No step-by-step 
development of the blood clotting system can be envisaged or indeed can be possible. In 
order to be at all useful (and thus not be deselected) the system must be instantiated in 
tala. 111is is equivalent, in Dawkins' words, to a miracle. Yet, ifnatural selection cannot 
explain how the clotting cascade came to be, then we are left with no alternative but to 
appeal to miracle - or the explanatorily better concept of intelligent design. 
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The immediate response to this might be that one can hold out for some further 
development in either natural selection (Darwinian) theory or for further details of how 
blood clotting works. Neither argument, if either of them can be dignified as such, will 
work. In the first place, natural selection in principle just means that gradual step by step 
mutations are accumulated due to their addition to the survivability of an organism over 
the long term. You cannot alter the theory simply to allow for the existence of such 
irr~ducibly complex systems as the coagulation system. Such an altered theory would not 
be the Darwinian OR neo-Darwinian mechanism at all, but an explanation of an entirely 
different kind. As regards the second argument, we need to recall the earlier discussion 
offtmctional irreducibility and the fact that any further reduction of biochemistry results 
simply in us moving into the realm of chemistry and physics. At that level, the 
Darwinian mechanism once again does not get a grip. Natural selection needs something 
living to work on; mutations do not happen at the level of the tau or neutrino but at the 
protein level - that is, at the level that biochemistry addresses. We have as full an 
explanation ofthe blood clotting system at that level as we need in order to show that it is 
indeed irreducibly complex. The scientist who holds out for further explanation may not 
do so for good scientific reasons, but perhaps because they are unwilling to surrender 
their metaphysical commitment to methodological naturalism. Although a wait and see 
attitude is appropriate in the field of empirical study (in other words, in any science), 
observation being the cornerstone of such disciplines; it is not useful where the 
underlying inability of a scientific discipline to further explain some phenomenon is 
concerned. 
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It would be apposite at this point to examine some of the criticisms that have or can be 
levelled against Behe' s theory. The first is a quick logical point of my own; I will then 
deal with the criticisms by H. Allen Orr; before turning to more concrete concerns that I 
have regarding Behe's work. 
3:4) Responses to and criticisms of Behe 
It does not seem to me at all necessary that because some systems partially constituting 
us as humans are irreducibly complex, that we are then in 1010 irreducibly complex5o• 
This would be an invalid form of argument, committing the fallacy of composition. I 
might equally by the same method point out reducibly complex systems within us and 
conclude that we are reducibly complex. However, Behe's argument turns on the point 
that Darwinism imagines a gradual process of step-by-step evolution; and an irreducibly 
complex system cannot have come about in such a way, since if any part of it were 
removed it would cease to function. Hence, any precursor system would have been 
useless and would have been deselected in the evolutionary process. Behe therefore 
appears to avoid the fallacy of composition. 
H. Allen Orr is Professor of Biology at Rochester University, with a primary research 
focus in the genetics of adaptationS!. His work on the evolutionary divergence of genes 
" I introduce this because one possible use of Behe's work would be by creationists. Creationists believe 
in the literal truth of the creation account given in Genesis I and 2. They thus believe in the creation of 
humans, for instaIlce, as they are in situ. The design theorist is not committed to this. 
51 !ill1ll/\\"\\"w . rochc"lcr.cdll/CollcgcfllIO/raolllt\'/Orr.h~llllast accessed 13 February 2003. 
81 
places him in a useful position to take up the Darwinist side of the rope. Orr attempts to 
avoid the problem of deselection for Darwinian evolutionary theory by use of exan1ple52• 
Orr points out that in the case of lungs, they evolved from intermediate stages such as 
airbladders, which in turn evolved from gills. Orr does not address the problems inherent 
in the first system ancestral to the lung. Surely that system would have to be irreducibly 
complex, at least at the biochemical level (it would seem that all biological systems are at 
base irreducibly complex, because, argues Behe, the cell is irreducibly complex. I shall 
dey~lop this point later.) Simply postulating another precursor in an infinite regress of 
ancestor systems is of no use. This would be a transparent and poor attempt to sidestep 
the)ssue of explaining how it is that something like a lung (or an airbladder, or gills, or 
w~a\ever) ac~ally works. Of course, evolution cannot explain that, since it is not in the 
purview of evolutionary theory to explain how living things work, but only how they 
came to be as we now find them. Other fields of biological endeavour deal with the 
actual functioning of organisms and their organs. 
Orr's central mistake is to confuse a function with a feature necessary for survival. The 
issue, however, is one of the emergence and continuity of iunction, not necessity for lite. 
What Orr misses is that if the function performed by the lungs were to be removed, the 
organism would die. In other words, the human being as a whole could, after all , be 
taken as irreducibly complex, needing a breathing apparatus in order to continue 
functioning as a human being. That is why we die when we stop breathing. To replace 
the airbladder with a lung is like replacing a Ford Model T with a Mondeo . One may be 
51 Orr, H. Allen; "Darwin v.lntelligent Design (Again)" from Boston Review; http ://www-
pol isci.In it.cdu/bostonrcvicw/br2 1 .6/0[( .htm 1 
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more advanced, but they are still perfonning the same function . I like to think of 
irreducible complexity as functional irreducible complexity, as elaborated in Chapter 
3.2. This fits in rather nicely, as it should, with the Darwinian story of functional 
adaptation, since the remarkable adaptation of means to ends in organisms is exactly the 
grounds of the debate between the evolutionary and the desib'Tl theorist. Reiterating the 
Darwinian mechanism is no reply to design theory, since it merely begs the question. 
Unfortunately, Orr's response seems at this point to be nothing more than question-
b<rgging. In other words, Orr does not disprove the logical conclusion of Be he's thesis as 
applied to breathing systems; namely, that whatever system first used by our ancestors to 
breatlle can in principle not be removed from that organism without the organism dying. 
By kimply pointing to Darwinism, in defence of an attaek aimed at that very construct, 
Orr effectively docs not contend the point, but begs it. I submit that Orr is representative 
of the attitude taken by most orthodox scientists, especially in biology and especially 
where informed by a naturalistic outlook. Such scientists, if! might group tllem together 
for the sake of the point, arc unwilling to treat criticisms of Darwinian theory on their 
merits, but WlfOrtWlUtely dig themselves behind the crumbling walls of the very fOltress 
Wlder attack. In philosophical parlance, that is called "begging the question". In more 
common language, it is to avoid the proverb "that the truth hurts". 
More damaging by far to Behe is the empirical problems that attach to his work. Behe 
makes claims regarding the number of proteins or amino acids required for life to exist, 
about the nwnber and nature of chemical constituents in the blood clotting system and the 
construction of bacterial flagella. Although Behe might well be quite correct in making 
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these statements of empirical fact, it is not quite obvious that they hold true over all times 
and places. In other words, although it may well have been true in 1996 that scientists 
believe that X proteins are necessary for life, it may equally be true in 2003 that scientists 
believe that X-3 proteins are necessary for life. Behe fails to properly distinguish 
between what scientists believe to be the facts of the matter at the biochemical level and 
what the facts of the matter really are. He further appears to equivocate between arguing 
that certain systems in humans are irreducibly complex at the biochemical level and that 
th.e:cell itself is irreducibly complex. If the latter is the case, then all life is irreducibly 
complex. It becomes unnecessary to independently argue that biochemical systems are 
irreducibiy compiex. Which is it? Is the ceii actuaily im~ducibly compiex? 0 .. are 
certain higher-order biochemical systems irreducibly complex? 
If Behe is to be taken seriously, he must make plain his position. The vagaries of 
evidence serve to change the conclusions we derive from empirical studies and thus to 
change our belief in something's really being irreducibly complex. However, if Bche's 
work is properly characterised as demonstrating that to the best of our current knowledge, 
certain biochemical systems or the cell arc irreducibly complex, then he is in no worse a 
position that Paley two centuries before. Given the information available to us; and that 
further inlormation is not likely to come in (certainly objectively less likely than in 
Paley's time, as we alrcady have more infonnation at our disposal than did he); inference 
to the best explanation says to believe that the systems to which Behe refers are designed. 
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3.5) Dembskian Analysis of Behe 
In this section I analyse Behe's biological evidence and subsequent inference to design in 
the light of the formalised version of the argument to design provided by Dembski. The 
three conditions that Behe needs to meet, as laid out in Chapter 2 are: (I) that the 
phenomena and systems that are put forward as evidence tor or instances of design have 
occurred or are in place; (2) that these phenomena and systems have a small probability 
qf occurring or being in place and (3) that these phenomena and systems admit of 
specification. In quasi-symbolic form once again, we must show that (8)53: 
(l) oc(E) 
(2) sp(E) 
(3) SP(E) 
(4) therefore des(E) 
Bearing these criteria in mind, how does Behe's account fare? I look to each criterion in 
tum. 
3.5.1 oc(E) 
As regards criterion (I), issue is already joined between the design theorist and his 
opponents. The central evidential claim of Behe's book is that the cell displays 
irreducible complexity at a certain level- namely, the biochemical level. His examples of 
SJ From Ch 2 ofthis paper. 
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the blood-clotting system and the like are not particularly important. They are additional 
to the main thesis, that the cell is fmally not reducible to individual components. 
Unfortunately, biologists are not in agreement with Behe as to the irreducible complexity 
of the cell. Although the concept is sound, there are plenty of biologists who simply 
disagree with Behe as to the reality of the irreducible complexity of the cell at the lowest, 
biochemical levels. Ifwe carmot establish that irreducible complexity has real existence, 
then we carmot say that event E has occurred. If E has in fact not occurred, of course, 
then the design inference cannot go through. Now, we know that cells exist and are at 
least reducible to such and such a point; but it remains unproven whether or not we have 
reached the last level of reduction. Since the publication of Behe's work, in fact, new 
. .. 
evidence in biochemistry has come to light that indicates that the base number of proteins 
needed for a functional cell is less than was believed at the time of that publication. In 
short, it is not at all clear, after all, whether Behe's most important irreducibly complex 
system is instantiated. This rather leaves the rest of the steps as unnecessary - there 
MAY be irreducibly complex systems; or there may not be. Science here has 
legitimately held out hope for further development and may be entitled thereby to 
continue to do so. In order for Behe's thesis to get oifthe ground, then, it is necessary for 
us to assume the truth of his main evidentiary claim. This is (unfortunately for Behe) an 
inauspicious start. Nonetheless, I examine the following steps on the basis of the 
assumption that were irreducibly complex systems shown to exist in living organisms, 
these steps would be necessary in order to demonstrate that said systems are irreducibly 
complex and the mark or product of design. 
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3.5.2 sp(E) 
With regard to probability, it is difficult to know whether the sorts of things Behe takes to 
be irreducibly complex do have a small probability of occurring. There is no independent 
means of establishing what this probability is. The relevant probability is that of the 
various parts of, say, the blood clotting system simply coming together in a way 
instantiating the function now fulfilled. The design theorist is going to argue that this 
prpbability is exceedingly low. The evolutionary biologist is simply going to argue that 
; 
the chance of, say the blood clotting system, being the way it is, is an event of at least 
intermediate probability. They would point out the perceived gradual development of the 
system and thus show how the design inference is not warranted, since millions of , 
probabilities that are not small have been realized to instantiate the system as is. The 
evolutionary biologist may even argue for the inevitability of the system turning out a 
certain way, that is, for a high probability and thus a regularity explanation. However, 
here they would be wrong simply because Darwinism is not a law of nature (it may still 
be refuted). The evolutionary biologist then seems to rule out the inference to design in 
attempting to establish the probability of the phenomena or systems Behe terms 
irreducibly complex. This is not justified because the design theorist is calling the 
Darwinian mechanism into question. It is no suitable defence for the evolutionary 
biologist to simply reavowtheir belief in the Darwinian theory. 
The epistemic probability that each side assigns to say; the cell's complexity, will be 
informed by the very epistemological frameworks that are partly at question -
methodological naturalism and intelligent design. Since any other position - literal 
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creationism, Lamarckianism, teleomechanism - fall directly into opposition with either of 
the two under examination, they cannot provide an independent probabilistic standard. If 
they could, they would by now have justified or renounced their own models of life; 
although some - like teleomechanism - are already finished as scientific research 
programmes. 
Ifwe are left at an impasse; or worse still, with no way ofjusti/}'ing the claim that system 
X:has a small probability of being as it is, then we cannot be licensed to believe that X is 
the result of any particular explanatory mode on Dembski's account. No probability 
being assigned to the event means that one must suspend judgement on the issue until the 
prbbability can be determined. Unfortunately, this is where Sober el aI's critique of 
Dembski comes into play. However, it seems more practical to think that the real 
chances of things simply coming together are always going to be low; and that if this is 
the objective probability actually involved in the calculation of sp(E), then the design 
theorist is correct. No amount of fiddling with probabilistic resources can change the fact 
that the initial probabilities are, as required by Dembski, low. 
3.5.3SP(E) 
As regards specification, it is met by the examples given. Both sides in the debate would 
surely grant that the eye as it is performs a function that is highly specified, i.e. it sees. It 
does not also hear or taste; it performs a function that a lesser but related system would 
not do as well, or could not do at all. This might actually be taken as an argument for 
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Behe's position, since it seems here that specification implies irreducible complexity. At 
the most basic level of optic systems, if something - indeed, anything - is removed, the 
system no longer perceives light at all. Consider for instance the gradual progression in 
eye evolution so beloved of Richard Dawkins. 
Dawkins argues that the apparent complexity of the eye, itself a favourite example of 
apparent design to Paley and the natural theologians, is easily explicable in terms of 
evolutions4• Given the account of evolution that Darwin advanced - that random 
variations plus natural selection results in adapted organisms - and given the mechanism 
of genetics, Dawkins believes he can utilize existing evidence from the natural world to 
demonstrate how, for instance, the remarkably complex human eye came to be. Dawkins 
points to the various kinds of eye that animal life forms now living exhibit'S. For 
instance, there is the human eye which organism's complexity qua eye is unsurpassed. 
There are at the lower end of the spectrum of complexity the eyes of certain ocean-
dwelling invertebrates, such as the limpet. Through examining various eyes from 
different parts ofthe animal kingdom, it is possible to find an array of eyes that exhibit an 
increasing degree of complexity. Ranging from a simple cup that traps light rays from a 
specific directions6 through deeper cups for more directional controls7 through jelly-filled 
cups that filter the light and through to the human eye, we can observe an increase in the 
number of parts and their collaborative effort to produce a clearer, sharper and more 
54 Dawkins; Climbing Mount Improbable; Ch. 5. 
"Ibidem pg. 127. 
56 Ibidem pg. 135 Fig. 5.3 
57 Ibidem pg. 136 Fig. 5.4 
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useful image5s. Given this range of complexity - and given that it is quite a complete 
range - Dawkins argues that it is quite clear how the human eye evolved. It evolved 
through stages such as those now typified by certain invertebrates. Each of those eyes is 
fully functional as is - after all, it seems evident that these invertebrates can indeed see. 
Their behaviour suggests that they see; and optics (that is, the physics oflight and vision) 
demonstrates they can see. These eyes, then, argues Dawkins, are precursor systems to 
the remarkable, complex human eye that design theorists claim to be God's direct 
Although, as I have indicated, it is not the contention of this dissertation that orthodox 
evolutionary theory is a failed thesis, I argue that Dawkins ' account of the developmental 
history bfthe eye constitutes nothing but wishful thinking. It is, as has been derogatorily 
said of various evolutionist descriptions, a 'Just-so story,,60. There is no evidence that the 
human eye evolved from such stages as is 'typified' by the other animals used in the 
model. In the first place, it is not obvious that the so-called simple eye is simple or that it 
has anything but a low probability of occurring - and as it already is specified and has 
occurred, it is thus a possible candidate for design. Neither human nor limpet eyes 
simply come into being fully intact, nor even photosensitive cells. Dawkins would have 
to account independently for this occurrence before making the gradualist move; 
otherwise the limpet eye is just another "black box", offering no explanation at all, but a 
biological/ail accompli. Furtbennore, to argue that the human eye evolved from such 
" Ibidem pg. 177 Fig. 530 
" Ibidem pg. 178 - 9. 
GO After Rudyard Kipling's Just So Stories, being fanciful accounls of how for instance the "Elephant Got 
His Trunk" or the "Giraffe Got His Neck". 
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stages on the basis of a comparison with other more 'primitive' animals is simply to beg 
the question, for it assumes the truth of gradual development - that is, of evolutionary 
theory. It is exactly this that is at question - can evolutionary theory, as characterized by 
Darwin, explain organs as complex as the eye? To appeal to gradualism in defence of 
gradualism is circular. Since the only reason to believe that the sort of eye that the limpet 
exhibits was ever a precursor to the human eye is an appeal to tlle truth of evolutionary 
theory, Dawkins' story doesn't get off the ground. There is no evidence for the belief or 
r<:itson to presume that the eye of the linlpet would possibly evolve further. Although the 
changes that Dawkins envisions in the eye of the limpet to become the eye of say the 
ragworm are relatively minor - the deepening of the cup, the filling of the cup with 
albuminous jelly - the changes that are necessary to get all the way to the human eye are a 
little more straining on one's credulity. That is not to say oflhand that it is impossible for 
such a process to occur. There is, however, no actual evidence that it has occurred, only 
an inference to that effect. Yet ironically, the same Richard Dawkins seems unwilling to 
admit the validity of inferences to design. 
It may seem that the discussion I have made of the eye is irrelevant to the issue of 
specification. However, it is not. We have already seen that prominent evolutionary 
biologists such as Michael Ruse believe (biological) organisms to have function and thus 
to be teleological in at least some limited sense. We have seen that the story other 
evolutionary biologists - such as Richard Dawkins - advance in an attempt to dismiss the 
apparently irreducible complexity of certain organs does not hold much explanatory 
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water. It seems clear that specification is indeed met in the cases that Behe addresses, 
both on an evolutionary account and on an intelligent design account. 
3.5.4 The Dembskian Final Analysis 
Hehe's argument seems to survive a Dembskian analysis relatively well. The empirical 
examples that he produces fit the criteria of being instantiated (that is, having occurred) 
, 
arid of being (highly) specified (that is, being patterned or compressible) perfectly. The 
objective probabilities of their simply coming about are exceedingly low and thus all the 
co,nditions warranting an inference to design are met. That there are objections should not 
\ 
surprise us - if the design judgement is properly characterised as an inference to the best 
explanation rather than as a non-defeasible judgement never giving rise to false positives, 
then we should exactly expect certain of our design inferences to be weaker than others 
overtime. 
3.6 Conclusion to the Chapter 
It appears that Paley's own examples of two centuries ago still stand - the eye remains 
virtually inexplicable, despite attempts by science to explain how it originated. The heart 
remains as specified today as then and as improbable of occurring just as is, springing 
form the ether. That is because the judgements made by Paley were of the objective 
probability of it being so as he subjectively knew it; and because the heart and eye indeed 
are specified. Behe then stands in exactly the same place as Paley before him; and if 
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Paley has thus managed to weather the storms of time, then there is reason to believe that 
Behe will too. After all, the argument they are forwarding is the same. 
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CONCLUSION 
I have argued that design explanations are a legitimate mode of explanation in the natural 
world, of lesser explanatory rigour but equal value to regularity and chance explanations. 
I demonstrated by reference to Paley, as representative of the school of natural theology, 
that design explanations of two centuries ago took a certain character. Through a critical 
examination of Hume's position on not only design but religion generally, I showed that 
d~sign explanations do not fall uselessly flat in the face of possible competing 
explanations, although they may give ground to trumping explanations. This was made 
dear in the introduction of the design filter devised by Dembski, which seeks to output 
th~ correct explanatory mode given the data entered about some or other event under 
explanatory consideration. I argued that there are subtle problems with Dembski's 
account, but that overall it is in line with the mainstream explanatory theory as put 
forward, for example, by Hempel. 
I then introduced Behe's work on irreducible complexity as a modem example in the 
same vein as Paley, arguing that they stand on the same logical footing. By running 
Behe's examples through the design filter, it is apparent that they meet the conditions 
necessary to accept design as their explanation, just as even Dawkins accepts Paley's 
conclusion of design. 
The central argument of the thesis is thus met, namely that Behe provides us, as did Paley 
two centuries ago, strong grounds both empirically and logically for believing that design 
is the proper mode of explanation for at least some of the events and phenomena in the 
world around us that appear designed but lack scientific explanations - that is, those 
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events and phenomena which not only require explanation because they exist, but which 
have a low probability of so existing and are specified, irreducibly complex or high 
carriers of information. 
I leave the last word to David Hume, so long thought the enemy of design arguments, but 
in the view I have forwarded, perhaps their best friend: 
FIN. 
If the whole of natural theology, as some people seem to maintain, resolves itself 
into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, that 
the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to 
human intelligence: If this proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or 
more particular explication: If it affords no inference that affects human life, or can 
be the so urce of any action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect as it is , can 
be carried no farther than to the human intelligence; and cannot be transferred, with 
any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of the mind: If this really be the 
case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than 
give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs; and 
believe, that the arguments, on which it is established, exceed the objections, which 
lie against it?" 
6] Hume; Dialogues; pg 185 
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